The article treats the law concerning legal aid adopted 1973 and its 1997 reform. It evaluates them based on Ronald Dworkin’s distinction between fundamental- and secondary utilities and two of Åke Frändberg’s legal security categories – equality before the law and access to justice. The analysis shows that while the 1997 legislation is founded on economic efficiency, the law from 1973 hinges on legal security for all. The result finds that the reform view legal aid as a secondary utility, while the law from 1973 express it as a fundamental utility. Thus, the view of legal aid changed: what was seen as a right, like the right to vote, is perceived in 1997 as the state’s ‘gift’. According to Frändberg’s categories we can conclude that the reform represents a weakening of access to justice and equality before the law. This implies discrimination against certain groups who, due to insufficient resources, will encounter difficulties in asserting their rights.