

# Bachelor Thesis

Bachelor's Programme in Social Science with major in  
Political Science



## The Rise of Solidarity

A comparative analysis of the change in Swedish foreign  
and security policy after the signing of the Lisbon  
Treaty

Political Science, 15 credits

Halmstad 2020-06-04

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# The Rise of Solidarity

A comparative analysis of the change in Swedish foreign and security policy after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty

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*Semester:* Spring 2020  
*Program:* Social Science with  
major in Political Science  
*Level:* Bachelor

## ABSTRACT

The change in Swedish foreign and security policy that took place during the post-Cold War era is well known. Sweden left the foreign and security policy based on the principle of “non-alignment in peace, aiming at neutrality in the event of war” and headed towards international cooperation within the field of foreign and security policy as well as signing the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 with the EU, which included the principle of solidarity.

By implementing a role-theory based analysis, this thesis aims to contribute to an understanding of the changes in Swedish security and foreign policy, which developed after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. The research stretches from 2006 until 2011 and examines Swedish foreign and security policy role change and role conceptions by using a comparative case study design of the Swedish Government’s annual foreign declarations.

Finally, this study suggests that Sweden no longer perceives itself as a neutral state, but rather than as a solidarity state. This shows that Sweden’s foreign and security policy has gone from neutrality to solidarity. In conclusion, the study’s result is that Sweden’s foreign and security policy change from neutrality to solidarity would not be possible without the changes in the foreign policy role conceptions.

**Keywords:** Swedish foreign policy, security policy, solidarity, neutrality, role theory.

*We would like to extend a special thanks to our supervisor who, with his dedication, made this paper possible.*

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

Sweden's foreign and security policy was, for a long time, characterized by the goal of achieving security by staying out of wars and conflicts. The policy of neutrality that later would come to describe Sweden's foreign and security policy up to the 1990s was shaped as early as the 19th century. During the Cold War, the policy of neutrality was manifested through the expression "non-alignment in peace aimed at neutrality in the event of war" which came to serve as Sweden's foreign and security policy doctrine during the 20th century (Bjereld, Johansson and Molin, 2008: 320; Rieker, 2006:66). The policy of neutrality was not only a political grip but also became a Swedish signal that people both in and outside the country linked up with Sweden's foreign policy stance. However, Jacob Westberg declares that during the first half of the 1990s, the Cold War policy of neutrality was phased out, and a new security policy line came to characterize Swedish security policy. This new line was the unilateral Swedish Declaration of Solidarity, which promises that Sweden "should not be passive if a catastrophe or attack would hit another EU member country or Nordic country" (Westberg, 2016:411). This line is something that has recurred continuously in Swedish security policy during the 21st century.

More recently, Sweden's non-alignment and neutrality have been given a different meaning. Sweden has since 1995 been a member of the European Union, which is certainly not a military alliance at present but is nevertheless a collaboration that obliges the member states. In addition to European cooperation's, Nordic cooperation's have changed and also developed to address foreign and security policy issues. The starting point of this paper consists of one of these events that have during the 2000s fundamentally affected Swedish security policy, which is the Lisbon Treaty solidarity clause that came into force in 2009 (Prop.2007/08:168). The problem of whether Sweden still retains its policy of neutrality or not has become even more remarkable, and there are both clear and complex answers to that question. In Magnus Petersson (2010) book about Swedish security policy, he declares that the foundation of Swedish security and defence policy has during the last 20 years been demolished and replaced. He continues and emphasises that an important indication that the change is genuinely profound is that the goals, means, and methods can be said to have changed. What Peterson wants to underline is that the entry into the European Union has meant that the neutrality policy has been replaced by solidarity policy and that this change has had a clear impact on Swedish politics (Petersson, 2010:148).

The fact that Sweden signed the declaration of solidarity during the 2000s with the member states of the European Union, in the light of Sweden's history as a non-alignment and neutral state, is to be considered remarkable. If the violation of neutrality policy is noteworthy and exciting in itself, it is from a scientific point of view both relevant and compelling to investigate the change in Sweden's foreign and security policy after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty's declaration of solidarity. This, in turn, can contribute knowledge and understanding about changes in a state's foreign policy positions and security policy policies. If the scientific contribution lies in explaining the states' foreign policy positions and shifts, the study is to be considered extraordinarily interesting as it presents a historical change in Swedish foreign and security policy.

### 1.1 RESEARCH FOCUS AND JUSTIFICATION

The Swedish Government's foreign declarations from 2006 and 2008 state:

The government wants to strengthen the European Union as a global foreign and security policy player. /.../ When we take part in shaping EU policy, it becomes an extension of our own. When the EU works for peace, the Union also speaks for us. When we contribute to EU security policy action, we also strengthen our security. We can use cooperation in the EU as a lever for our foreign and security policy - while not hesitating to raise our voice (Regeringen, 2006).

Sweden's foreign policy will contribute to freedom, peace, and reconciliation, both in our own and in other parts of the world. It is based on clear values in the standards that support our society and our interests. The work of promoting democracy, human rights, and sustainable development permeates Swedish foreign policy (Regeringen, 2008).

According to the Swedish Government, Sweden must be a driving force in the development of the European Union as a global player, not least in terms of peace and security policy. Through a broad and effective foreign policy, Sweden wants to work for the EU to be well equipped to meet the global challenges facing Europe and the world (Regeringen, 2006; 2008). Although Sweden has not been marked as a neutral state since 1945, there is a perception that Swedish neutrality lives on in many places. Since the early 1990s, the Swedish government and parliament have revised the Swedish security policy guidelines to a more integrated direction, where the emphasis is placed on increasing cooperation with other parties instead of pursuing the issues independently (Dalsjö, 2010:61).

The Swedish solution to its security policy challenges has been explicitly portrayed as a balance between three main alternatives. The first is the old Undén-Palme line, where neutrality politics linked an egocentric small-state realism in the hardcore of security policy with an uncompromising charged policy on global issues where the UN was considered to have a unique position. The second is European integration within the EU, including its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The third and last include integration within the transatlantic framework with NATO through partnerships for peace and, to an extent, through membership with the organisation (Dalsjö, 2010:61).

As the EU developed in the 1990s to become a political alliance in practice, Sweden could not maintain its previous policy of neutrality. In 1991, under the leadership of Carl Bildt, the centre-right government presented a budget bill according to which neutrality policy could no longer be used as an appropriate all-encompassing depiction of the security and foreign policy where Sweden wishes to implement within the European framework (Dalsjö, 2010:65). With its entry into the EU, Sweden was influenced by the organisation and therefore changed its foreign and security policy. As the modern technology community grows, this also triggers vulnerability for many countries. The technology development – or the digitization – has enabled cyber-terrorism, hacking, and bugging at the national level, which has made our world increasingly unsafe. The cross-border threats have highlighted a need for further cooperation with the organisation and therefore affected all member states. The EU has chosen to implement various strategies and treaties to meet these challenges, where the Lisbon Treaty is an essential pillar of a security-linked foreign and security-bound Europe. The entry into force of the Lisbon treaty has resulted in EU member states now having access to a particular solidarity clause (Ekengren, 2010:81).

Throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century, there has been confusions as to what has affected Sweden's change in political guidelines. The entry into the European Union raised several questions regarding this particular subject, and research explicitly reflects this misperception. Due to a gap in the research field that focuses on Swedish security policy concerning the EU, this study aims to help clarify how Sweden's foreign and security policy was affected by the Lisbon Treaty's solidarity clause and if it is true that Sweden has left the neutrality policy truly and transitioned to a full-blown solidarity state.



## 1.2 PURPOSE, RESEARCH QUESTION, AND OPERATIONALIZATION

The objective of this study is to contribute to an understanding of the changes in Swedish security and foreign policy after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. The Lisbon Treaty affected all member states of the European Union and generated a more united Europe. With the signing, it is considered that Swedish policy took a clear turn from neutrality policy to a solidarity policy. The study will examine the transition and whether this is correct or not. The study hopes to contribute to more knowledge in the field of Swedish security policy and how one should define Sweden's political position in this area.

The study's research question is the following:

- How has the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 affected Swedish foreign and security policy, as expressed in Swedish foreign declarations between 2006-2011?

To answer the study's research question, one main kind of material is used. The foremost material is based on the Swedish Government's annual foreign declarations over the period 2006-2011. The government's annual foreign declarations to the Parliament is when the incumbent government presents its ambitions and goals for Sweden's foreign, security, aid, and trade policy for the coming year. The foreign declaration is thus regarded as Sweden's declared foreign policy, which the government undertakes to follow during the year (Regeringen, 2015).

The Lisbon Treaty was sealed in 2007 and officially entered into force in 2009. This means that it is beneficial to analyse foreign declarations both before and after the implementation of the Treaty. Therefore, the selected years for this study are 2006-2011. The selected material will be reviewed and analysed based on Lisbeth Aggestam's role theory (Aggestam, 2004:56). By applying role theory, Sweden's set of foreign policy roles will be studied and how the change affects the focus on Swedish foreign and security policy. Foreign policy roles are made up of what policymakers perceive on behalf of their rights and obligations concerning the international system. Foreign policy roles, in turn, tends to affect the decision-makers' worldview and its foreign policy actions (Aggestam, 2004:56, 77).

Concretely we will assess how and why Sweden took certain roles by using Aggestam's role theory. The role(s) that we will apply to the analysis of Sweden's foreign declarations between the years 2006-2011 is "*the independent*," "*contributor to peace and security*," "*the leader*," "*pro-European partnership*," "*advocate for a wider Europe*," and "*non-alignment*"

*collaborator.*” By doing this, it will be assessed how Sweden’s foreign and security policy has changed after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty and if it is possible to see traces of certain roles in the development of the policy. The scientific contribution thus consists in analysing the change in Swedish foreign and security policy based on other theories than previously used and thus contributing with further understanding of how states’ positions and policy change can be understood.

### 1.3 LIMITATIONS

The study’s limitations are based on previous research done on the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on Swedish foreign and security policy and Lisbeth Aggestam’s Role Theory. The choice to use the Swedish government’s foreign declarations as the basis of the study’s material is because it is the best way to get a clear picture of how Sweden works with foreign and security issues. The study is limited to foreign declarations between the years 2006-2011. This period is examined because it gives an insight into Swedish foreign and security policies before and after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty.

### 1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

Initially, the study’s problem area has been presented together with the study’s purpose and research question. Chapter two includes the study’s background, which is vital to get an in-depth picture of the circumstances that have led to the Swedish security policy doctrine. In chapter three, the previous research on the subject will be presented, which will be linked to the study’s analysis and result. Chapter four presents the theoretical framework for Lisbeth Aggestam’s Role Theory that forms the basis of the study. Chapter five includes the method that presents the more detailed operationalization of the theory applied to the result and analysis. The result and analysis are presented in chapter six and will be discussed and concluded in chapter seven. Finally, chapter eight contains the source list of the study.

## 2. BACKGROUND

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to Swedish foreign policy in order to make it easier to understand the analysis. The chapter will, therefore, explain the circumstances that have led to the Swedish security policy doctrine. This examination is essential since this will give a more in-depth picture of the different aspects that are important to consider when analysing Sweden's security and foreign policy regarding neutrality, solidarity, and the EU.

### 2.1 SWEDISH POLICY OF NEUTRALITY

Ove Bring explains in his book about Swedish neutrality's rise and fall that the concept of neutrality is a concept of international law. It presupposes an ongoing war in the outside world and implies impartiality in this war. The neutral state usually chooses neutrality under its sovereignty, but since this election is made, it has to defend its territory with military force from the warring side. The other side of the coin is that warring states must respect the territory and sovereignty of a neutral state as long as impartiality is genuine (Bring, 2008:17). Neutrality as foreign policy choice was a long-held concept in Sweden. Neutrality as a label on Swedish security policy has been replaced by a non-alignment policy, a concept that better corresponds to the political reality after the end of the Cold War and Sweden's entry into the EU (Bring, 2008:13). Nevertheless, Swedish neutrality has a long history and has characterized foreign and security policy for several decades. It is, therefore, no wonder that the neutrality concept is still a recurrent theme in Swedish foreign and security policy discussions.

Swedish neutrality history began already in the 17th and 18th centuries, as a strategy to protect shipping and trade, but it was in the 19th century that the Swedish policy of neutrality was declared with a more modern cut. They aimed at creating confidence in the outside world and keeping the country out of wars. This policy was introduced by Karl XIV Johan during the so-called 1812 policy and was followed by the 1834 declaration of neutrality in the face of a feared superpower war (Bring, 2008:15). Neutrality as an "international law regime" did not reach maximum status until 1907 when the neutrality rules were codified at the Second Peace Conference in Hague. Then it became increasingly common for parliamentarians to argue that their home countries should declare themselves permanently neutral (Bring, 2008:15).

During the First World War, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway succeeded in protecting their neutrality, as did Switzerland and Spain. Later, in the Second World War, neutrality worked for Sweden, Switzerland, and Portugal, but not for so many other European countries (Bring, 2008:16). The more modern neutrality, which is more commonly known, originated from the end of the 1960s when Olof Palme was the prime minister of Sweden, states Robert Dalsjö (2010) in his chapter a book about Swedish security policy. It was also during this time that Sweden's neutrality became a complicated matter as Sweden, with its neutral role in international politics, also had to act on both sides of the political balance scale. On one side, there has been a policy of neutrality with activist content. While on the other, they have, at the same time, acting as a mediator in conflicts. A clear example of this balance is Olof Palme's criticism of the US for the war in Vietnam. Given that Sweden decided to be neutral, they were placed in a situation where they gained limited independence from international pressure. By criticizing the United States, this generated the announcement of its neutral position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and vice versa (Möller and Bjereld, 2010:376).

Nils Andrén (2002) expresses in a book that focuses on Swedish security policy in Europe and the world that Swedish neutrality and non-alignment has generated a great role as a peacemaker and balancing actor on the international political arena (Andrén, 2002:147-149). Just like Dalsjö, Andrén express that Swedish politics has during the 20th century been about influencing political decisions based on characteristics such as impartiality, or in other words, a non-alignment state. Dalsjö then describes that during the second half of the Cold War, Swedish foreign policy changed the course from being cautious to more idealistic and morally orientated.

Sweden's policy of neutrality was during the late 20th century, still the basic idea but was instead used as a prerequisite to counteract oppression and misunderstandings. After the Cold War, however, Sweden transitioned to a state with solidarity policy, which was a reflection of the entry into the European Union. After entering the European Union, Sweden is said to have successively lost its label entirely as a neutral state, with politics that has reflected its neutral placement in world politics. Sweden has not engaged in any conflict since the Second World War, except for a role as peacekeepers. Even though they have not engaged in conflicts, there is a problematic surrounding the word neutrality and if this is permeated in Swedish politics today or not (Bring, 2008:19).

## 2.2 SWEDEN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Economic Communities (EEC) was created in 1957. When the EEC was formed, only six European Countries – Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Germany – were members. In 1990, after the fall of the Eastern bloc, a new reformation of the organisation took place, and in 1993 after the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union was established in the form that we know it to be today. The uniqueness of the EU is how the structure is set up to give influence on all member states on as many levels as possible. The EU also has a controlling power in the form of laws and regulations. However, the right of decision, legislation, and implementation of those decisions is something that all the member states vote on together (European Commission, 2020).

Sweden's road to membership in the European Union began on July 1, 1991, as a result of the new political tone which came with the fall of the Soviet Union. The referendum in 1994 was a further step towards membership in the EU, and on January 1, 1995, the Swedish membership in the EU became official. Since Sweden's entry, EU policy has influenced the Swedish, and the bond between them has been strengthened successively over the years. Sweden initially demanded certain conditions in order to maintain its non-alignment- and security policy. Nevertheless, those working in the foreign administration have noticed a certain lack of these conditions and have experienced a greater *Europeanization* of the previously more nationally oriented security policy (Engelbrekt, 2010:11, 13). A definition of Europeanization that is often used in research comes from Kevin Featherstone's and Claudio Radaelli's (2003) book *The politics of Europeanization*. They explain that Europeanization is a collection of approaches that deal with development, dissemination, institutionalization, and the creation of both formal and informal rules. The rules and laws are then adopted by the EU and finally implemented at the national level in the member states (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003:3).

However, the Europeanization has received some criticism. As the EU began to influence national policies, a question arose as to whether what was most important to protect, the nation, or the union? The EU has clear programs of action that the member states should follow; for example, the EU crisis management will more likely affect Swedish risk and resource assessments. The European Union has an impact on Sweden's definition of what is to be protected, and through the solidarity clause in the Lisbon Treaty, this has become increasingly diffuse. With the Lisbon Treaty, Sweden has signed a joint responsibility to protect the "*civilian population*." For the first time, the European Union, in the context of the solidarity clause,

designates a distinct population that can be interpreted as “*the people of Europe*.” Sweden’s protection object now also includes EU citizens from all member states. The problems surrounding this have generated two clear views on whether Europeanization has been advantageous or not for a country like Sweden. The first approach values the EU’s power role primarily based on the added value it can provide to existing national systems and resources. The other approach, on the other hand, takes its premise from a European perspective, and the nation is first seen as an assembled part of the Union’s social security. These two approaches form the basis for many of the researcher’s questions about the problems that circulate the concept of Europeanization and whether it is advantageous or not for EU member states (Ekengren, 2010:81-82, 91-92).

### 2.3 THE RISE OF THE SOLIDARITY POLICY AND THE LISBON TREATY 2007

At the beginning of the 1990s, Sweden began to approach the European Union more and more, and it was with this connection that the principle of neutrality began to decline. In a book about the Nordic countries as great powers and peace associations, Fredrik Doeser (2012) writes that the turning point for the Swedish principle of neutrality began with the change of government in 1991. Sweden then went from a social democratic government to a centre-right, with Carl Bildt at the head. The Bildt government laid out new guidelines for Swedish security policy, and it was primarily about developing closer European cooperation and taking an active role in the development of foreign and security policy in the European Community (EC), which then became the European Union (Doeser et al., 2012:186).

Sweden’s membership in the European Union marked a turning point for Sweden’s security policy. Andrén (2002) describes it as Sweden’s role in the international arena has changed from an earlier endeavour to highlight its security policy character to the desire to enter into international security cooperation (Andrén, 2002:11). However, Sweden has maintained the military non-alignment as an essential part of foreign and security policy. Ulf Bjereld and Tommy Möller (2012) argue that the reason why Sweden has chosen to guard the non-alignment is to find that freedom of alliance allows Sweden to maintain an independent foreign and security policy, especially towards the US. The pursuit of an independent foreign and security policy is, according to Bjereld and Möller, one of Sweden’s overall goals, which is supported by Sweden’s participation in international crisis management missions (Bjereld and Möller, 2010:377-378).

A clear turning point, not only for the Swedish security policy but also for the European Union's security and foreign policy guidelines, came in 2007 when dictating and ratifying the Lisbon Treaty. The treaty includes amendments to the EU's basic treaty and resulted in a structural change in foreign and security policy (Regeringskansliet, 2008:198). Sweden approved the Lisbon Treaty in December 2008, and in a bill from the government, they commented on the declaration of solidarity that Sweden "will not passively react if a disaster or attack would hit another member State or Nordic country. We expect these countries to act in the same way as Sweden" (Prop. 2008/09:140).

The main purpose of the Lisbon Treaty is to create a more welded Europe, where member states act together in the event of threats or conflicts. The treaty states that in the event of conflicts of threats such as terrorist attacks or disasters, all member states must act under clear guidelines. An essential aspect of a more welded Europe is that the assistance that each member country needs in a crisis should also be reciprocal. There should be no countries that received more or less assistance than another; this part of the treaty is called the solidarity clause (Regeringskansliet, 2008:198).

Sweden has gone through different stages of its security and foreign policy. They have gone from a declaratory doctrine based on non-alignment in peace aimed at neutrality in war to a more policy of alliance with the member states of the European Union, and their Nordic neighbours. During the Cold War, however, Sweden's politics were seen as a scale where one side was focused on neutrality and freedom of action, while the other one was keeping a "lifeline" to the western powers if the policy of neutrality would fail. Dalsjö (2010), however, explains that Sweden might have trouble living up to the practical aspects of being a solidarity country. Some debate the fact that Sweden has throughout the years decommissioning its military in time of peace. This decommissioning results in fewer means to assist countries in the event of a crisis. While this may be seen as a problem, Dalsjö believes that in the case of international disorder, Sweden will take its responsibility towards neighbouring countries and member states and contribute in any way possible (Dalsjö, 2010:77,78).

### 3. LITERATURE REVIEW

The study's previous research is presented in the following chapter. The goal is to describe the research field and get a picture of how member states in the EU developed after the signing of the treaty. The literature review demonstrates what research has previously been done, this to gain a greater understanding of the subject and to show what gap the study covers.

#### 3.1 THE TREATY'S EFFECT ON THE EUROPEAN UNION

Many studies have been made on how the European Union and the member states have been affected by the Lisbon Treaty. However, there is a lack of studies on how the solidarity clause was implemented in the member states and how their national policies changed thereafter. Thomas Christiansen writes in the article *The European Union after the Lisbon Treaty: An Elusive 'International Balance'* (2011) that the institutional architecture of the EU had until the Lisbon Treaty seen relatively few significant reforms since the formation of the Communities in the 1950s. Christiansen's study examines the new institutional dynamics of the EU after the Lisbon Treaty, with a particular focus on the relationship between the European Commission and the Council of Ministers. Christiansen states that the 1965 Merger Treaty had united previously independent institutions, and the transformation of the parliamentary assembly into a directly elected legislature at the end of the 1970s made up the basis of what we today know to be the European Union (Christiansen, 2011:226).

With the signing of the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties, in the 1990s, the member states of the European Union agree to transfer certain powers from member states' national governments to the EU across diverse areas. These reforms include legislation on immigration, adopting criminal and civil laws, and enacting foreign and security policy, as well as implementing institutional changes for expansion as new member nations join the EU. This writes Thomas Christiansen, Anna-Lena Högenauer, and Christine Neuhold in the article *National Parliaments in the post-Lisbon European Union: Bureaucratisation rather than Democratization* (2014:122). Their article develops a framework for analysing the Europeanization of national parliaments that starts after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. Before the Lisbon Treaty, the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties were the most revolutionary action plans towards a more improved conjoint military and security policy in the union. The member states, as well as the union itself, saw a major change when adapting the Lisbon Treaty. It is seen as one of the most significant structural changes for the European Union (Holmberg, 2010:135).



This study will focus on the solidarity clause and the Lisbon Treaty, but the treaty involves many other reforms as well. The main reforms contain the formation of a semi-permanent President of the European Council, the establishment of a European External Action Service, a new role of the High Representative as Vice-President of the European Commission and Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU- a new configuration of the Council of Ministers that is officially unconnected from the General Affairs Council. Additionally, the powers of the European Parliament have been prolonged, with crucial new policy areas such as agriculture, trade, justice, and home affairs, which is now falling under the co-decision procedure. The European Parliament also assimilated the power to command international agreements of the union and to elect the President of the European Commission, leading to the further politicization of EU decision-making. Additional significant innovations coming with the Lisbon Treaty contains the European Citizens Initiative, the new powers for the national parliament, and the raised status of advisory bodies such as the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. In terms of institutional balance within the union, the two key changes are the formation of the posts of European Council President and High Representative for Foreign Policy (Christiansen 2011:228).

All the reforms in the Lisbon Treaty surround the fact that the goals are to make a more united Europe. One of the most critical parts of the treaty, however, is the articles regarding security and foreign policy. One central part of the treaty that focuses on security- and foreign policy cooperation between the member states is the solidarity clause.

Ekengren (2010) writes in his chapter that the Lisbon treaty generated more cross-sectoral coordination within the European Union and that it helped to resolve the ongoing divide between external and internal security and crisis management. The solidarity clause is one crucial milestone that reflects this action to resolve the divide (Ekengren, 2010:87). The study that Ekengren does critically examines contemporary Swedish security policy based on a European perspective. The idea of the study was to empirically investigate which problems are referred to as security policy problems, and which are handled as such by Swedish political agencies and institutions. Ekengren concludes that the European Union has seen many changes since the Lisbon Treaty and that further alterations to the institutional foreign and security policies will come. Henceforth additional effects will happen on both the institutional level, and the member states' national level (Ekengren, 2010:104).

### 3.2 THE TREATY'S EFFECT ON THE MEMBER STATES

The necessities in the Lisbon Treaty on national parliaments, the ratification process of the treaty itself, and the euro crisis have all contributed to give more influence and visibility to some national parliaments. No longer are the member states just reinforcing the position of their governments in EU negotiations and ratifying agreements on crucial issues of the European integration process. They are now also increasingly becoming essential players in EU daily business, in decisions regarding the disbursement of financial bailouts, the control of budget decisions, or the full application of the Schengen Agreement in some new member states. However, it could be expected that the Lisbon Treaty would increase opportunities for participation for the national parliaments. Especially in those countries with weaker parliamentary scrutiny systems. The objective of the article *The Spanish Parliament and EU Affairs in the Post Lisbon Treaty Era: All Change?* (2014) by Sonia Piedrafita is to look into the puzzle regarding the Lisbon Treaty's effect on national parliaments in the EU. The analysis is not circumscribed to the implementation of the subsidiarity check; it also covers the possible 'spillover' effect on the parliamentary scrutiny of the executive in EU affairs (Piedrafita, 2014:451). The Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in December 2009, raised expectations about the scrutiny of EU affairs by national parliaments and their participation in EU decision-making. It was the first time that the national parliaments had been included in the body of a treaty (Piedrafita, 2014:455).

In resemblance to Piedrafita's article does Christiansen, Högenauer, and Neuhold a similar study, as mentioned above. Their study focuses not only on the effect that national parliaments might or might not have at EU-level but also on the reverse. It also tackles the question of whether and in what way the new opportunities arising from the Lisbon Treaty transformed the practices and procedures of national parliaments. As previously stated, has the study developed a framework for the analysis of the Europeanization of national parliaments, where main indicators are the processes of transnationalization and bureaucratisation. Christiansen, Högenauer, and Neuhold also research typologies of national parliaments grounded on the hypothesis that the more Europeanized parliaments tend to invest more into their administrative resources and will involve to a more considerable extent with other national parliaments as well as with EU-level actors (Christiansen et al., 2013:122).

Unlike most of these previous contributions, Christiansen et al. present a theoretical framework designed to identify if and how EU-level changes affect the national level (Christiansen et al., 2013:122). They clarify each of these developments independently and establish possible connections between them. In particular, the argument that the Europeanization triggered by the Lisbon Treaty not only has impacts on domestic structure and procedures but leads, as a consequence, to processes of transnationalization and bureaucratisation. The suggested framework relies on the following main elements:

- (1) first, a process of Europeanization of national parliaments, indicating the potential changes within domestic arrangements, procedures and resource allocations in response to developments at the European level;
- (2) second, a process of transnationalization, being concerned with the potential intensification of contacts through transnational networks of policymakers from national parliaments and EU institutions; and
- (3) third, a process of bureaucratisation, resulting from the potential for administrative players playing a significantly greater role concerning the internal handling of EU affairs in national parliaments and the development of transnational networks (Christiansen et al., 2013:123).

Foreshowing the process of Europeanization will mean that national parliaments need to adjust to the shifting structure of the post-Lisbon European Union. The magnitude of this depends on existing working practices, available resources, and the party-political context. Christiansen et al. (2013) identified that national parliaments would need to build up technical capacities in order to deal with the new amount of legislative changes, and by doing this, the Lisbon Treaty will be fully implemented (Christiansen et al., 2013:135).

As we mentioned earlier, it is difficult to find studies that are similar to our own. On the other hand, several studies examine more broadly the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the EU and its member states. There are also studies describing the solidarity clause's implementation process, but not how the solidarity clause has affected member states in the European Union. It is, therefore, essential to examine how the Lisbon Treaty, and more specifically, how the solidarity clause has affected foreign and security policy in the EU. However, since it is relatively broad to investigate the treaty's impact on the entire EU, the study will, therefore, only focus on Sweden.

### 3.3 THE TREATY'S EFFECT ON FINLAND AS A NEUTRAL STATE

Amongst studies on the treaty's effect on Swedish security and foreign policy, many also comprise other countries. There are a few states in the European Union that are defined as neutral and one of them being Sweden's neighbouring country Finland. However, most of the research on Finland concerning their foreign and security policy is focused on NATO and whether or not they should become members. Therefore, there is a gap in the field regarding the European Union, and especially the Lisbon Treaty's effect on the country.

Furthermore, Finland has almost had the same road towards solidarity as Sweden. Both Sweden and Finland have adapted their former neutrality policies in favour of protracted participation in the European community. Indifference from Sweden, Finland has shown less necessity in guaranteeing that an appropriate international role balances its policy of neutrality. The public debate has pointed at differences in policy between Sweden and Finland, where Finland has a stronger focus on national security. The Finish government has, through time, shown to be more open-minded towards future membership in NATO and an evolved cooperation with the European Union (Möller and Bjereld, 2010:363-364).

Ulrika Möllers and Ulf Bjerelds article *From Nordic neutrals to post-neutral Europeans: Differences in Finnish and Swedish policy transformation* (2010) aims to exploit an analytical framework that treats neutrality as an established idea containing unintended and righteous beliefs. Bjereld and Möller give a background to how and why Finland is seen as a neutral state and how they have evolved in the same way Sweden has. Like many other European countries, both Sweden and Finland have been impacted by EU membership policies. The policies are apprehended through the concept of Europeanization which is, in the article cited as "a set of regional economic, institutional, and ideational forces for change also affecting national policies, practices, and politics" (Möller and Bjereld, 2010:365). Europeanization is likely to influence the foreign policies of EU countries just as other policy areas do. Both Sweden and Finland have been referred to as "post-neutrals" and has become gradually involved in the developing European security architecture. They, along with other member states, support this development in order to make Europe more united. However, Finland's transition from neutrality to a policy of solidarity has been possible through their open attitude towards the EU and NATO (Möller and Bjereld, 2010:365,375,377).

Additionally, the impact in which the Lisbon Treaty has effected this change in Finland's foreign and security policy is discussed in Leo G. Michel's (2011) article *Finland, Sweden, and NATO: From "virtual" to Formal Allies*. Michel, a researcher at the National Defence University, writes that during the negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty, Finland's government was strongly for the treaty being implemented on the member states and that the country would take part in all of the obligations that come with it. Moreover, many Finish experts' qualms that the EU would be able to, in the future, congregate the military competence and political determination necessary to discourage or defeat a potential aggressor. Michel continues and explains that the Lisbon Treaty has affected Finland in a way that they have to open their mind towards the importance of European cooperation. Before the Treaty, Finland's focus was mainly on whether or not it was essential to engage in an alliance with NATO, therefore in the aftermaths of the treaty's implementation, Finland sees "regional and, European cooperation as another element of its national security" (Michel, 2011:1,4).

That being said, there are several similarities between the foreign and security policy change in Sweden and Finland. These similarities are mainly concerning the discussion and approach to NATO, but also similarities about the foreign and security policy change that took place after the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. These similarities will further be discussed in the study's discussion chapter.

## 4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter presents the study's theory. The theory is of the utmost importance for the study's operationalisation as the theory presented in this chapter is used as an analytical basis for reviewing the study's chosen empirical data. It is from the following theoretical perspectives that the study's material is analysed, where Lisbeth Aggestam's role theory will be used as the analytical framework.

### 4.1 PRESENTATION OF ROLE THEORY

The overall purpose of role theory is to go beyond classical material explanatory factors such as the size, economic strength, and military capacity of states to explain state positions and policies (Breuning, 2011:20-21). Role theory focuses on the relationship between actor and structure but differs from other theoretical perspectives by understanding international relations as based on the idea that there is an interaction between actor and structure (Aggestam, 2004:56). This is because role theory originates from the sociological research field, where the concept of role is the basis for studies of social conflicts as well as social consensus. In sociology, the role is understood as a link between an individual's personality and the social structures in which the individual resides. Role theory thus focuses on the dynamics between individuals and social structures, how they collaborate and interact (Aggestam, 2004:56). Role theory is therefore useful for studies of foreign policy. Instead of individuals, states, and their actions concerning the international system can be analysed. In this case, the states' security and foreign policy role is to be regarded as a set of rights and obligations that decision-makers perceive and adhere to (Aggestam, 2004:56, 77).

A role can thus be linked to an ethical and moral framework based on which decision-makers both map out problems and make decisions. The role prescribes a certain type of behaviour, which makes role theory interesting to apply to states' positions and policies. After that, the results of a survey can be used to estimate future arrangements and decisions. Applying role theory analyses non-material aspects such as state self-perception in order to explain state positions and policy changes. However, role theory should not be regarded as a uniformly influential theory but rather as a set of frameworks from which states' positions and roles can be analysed (Aggestam, 2004:13). Role theory is closely linked to the concept of identity. Lisbeth Aggestam (2004) describes role theory as "a tool for reading the meaning behind the actions of states" (Aggestam, 2004:71, 77).

Identity is understood in Aggestam's dissertation as a self-orientation system that can be applied to a broad spectrum of political action. According to Aggestam, this differs from the concept of role, which instead aims at the concrete meaning of foreign policy action, what actors express as their intentions and motives (Aggestam, 2004:71). Identity can thus be understood as a context from which roles are created and changed, while roles themselves express how foreign policy action is perceived (Aggestam, 2004:3, 12). Pernille Rieker (2006) expresses a similar view of identity when she describes the national security identity of states. According to Rieker, the security identity of states is a product of the currently dominant security discourse. The security discourse consists of the generally accepted definition of security among leading politicians and, together with the national security identity, constitutes a framework within which policy decisions can be made (Rieker:2006:9-10). Common for both Aggestam and Rieker is that identity is understood as something fundamental when it comes to shaping the state's foreign policy. Aggestam takes the identity discussion a step further by including role theory, while Rieker chooses to focus more deeply on the very construction of the state's national security identity.

Since this study aims at investigating the possible change in Swedish security and foreign policy that developed after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008, role theory is the main component of the analysis. At the same time, the importance of identity is not impaired in the design of different roles. However, the study is aimed at explaining Sweden's position and change of policies, which makes role theory well suited. While role theory in previous research often focuses on individual specific roles, Marjike Breuning (2011) considers that a role theoretical analysis may well include that decision-makers move between different roles, *multiple roles*, in different parts of foreign policy decision-making.

Breuning believes that a state can assume different foreign policy roles (Breuning, 2011:32). The theory of multiple roles can be used to explain changes in states' role perception and policy design over time. This assumes that several roles can be observed and that it is later possible to study whether one state successively abandons one role in favour of another (Breuning, 2011:32). We find this theory interesting to apply in the analysis as it could help explain if Swedish foreign and security policy has gone from the principle of independence and neutrality to cooperation and solidarity.

## 4.2 LISBETH AGGESTAM'S ROLE THEORY

The foreign policy roles used in this study are partly based on previous research on Swedish security and foreign policy presented in previous sections, but also on Aggestam's role set discussed below. Since Aggestam has already done a feasibility study to map out general foreign policy roles, we do not see the need to do the same. Instead, we adopt Aggestam's role set with previous research on Swedish security and foreign policy and thus create an analytical framework adapted to the problem formulation for this study. Aggestam's analysis of France, Great Britain, and Germany's foreign policy was based on six different categories of roles, which she defined based on a preparatory study of the three countries' role and identity concerning foreign policy (Aggestam, 2004:77-79). In the analysis, Aggestam was clear about not locking the material into the predefined categories. Instead, she considered the six fundamental roles as a typology. The typology included the following roles: "*pro-European partnership*," "*the leader*," "*advocates for a wider Europe*," "*the NATO ally*," "*contributors to peace and security*," and "*the independent*." In the analysis, Aggestam focused on the meaning attributed to the various roles, how they had changed over time, and which roles were considered more critical (Aggestam, 2004:79).

We find five of Aggestam's roles applicable to our case in the analysis of Sweden's security and foreign policy. The role of "*the NATO ally*" will not be included in our investigation. In addition to Aggestam's roles, we have identified one more role, which is aimed explicitly at Sweden. The role we have identified is called "*non-alignment collaborators*." The role of "*non-alignment collaborators*" reflects the change in Swedish security and foreign policy from the end of the Cold War to the beginning of the 2000s. The role is also in line with, among other things, Andrén's (2002) explanation of the change in Swedish security policy from an emphasis on security policy uniqueness to the embrace of international cooperation. When reading and analysing the material, four main indicators will be used to identify the parts of the text that express Sweden's role beliefs. The indicators are essential elements in the analysis of the material as they prescribe what in the text symbolise a certain role perception. Without indicators or similar frameworks, the analysis could not live up to the requirement of transparency and research independence (Esaïasson et al., 2012:25). However, we would like to emphasise that the indicators are not considered as analysis objects. Instead, the indicators are used as a tool to be able to read out the parts of the material that express Sweden's role beliefs.



The indicators are made up of *commitments*, *duties*, *functions*, and *obligations* and are the same ones that Aggestam used in her study and survey to identify the statements that indicated an expectation of foreign policy behaviour (Aggestam, 2004:78-79). It is thus the formulations that express Sweden's *commitments*, *duties*, *functions*, and *obligations* that in the material symbolise Sweden's security and foreign policy roles, in other words, how Sweden perceives itself. Common to the four indicators is that they indicate what expectations the decision-makers have on Sweden and Sweden's role in various issues. The design and articulation of expectations, for their part, reflects the role(s) in which Sweden is acting.

In Aggestam's study, there is no detailed description or definition of the indicators. It may seem problematic from the point of view that the analysis model may appear vague. At the same time, there is a point in not allowing theoretical definitions to guide analysis, especially when states' self-perception and the role of interest are of grave importance. This is because role theory is based on the assumption that states themselves define the roles from which they read the outside world and make decisions (Aggestam, 2004:29).

We initially used Aggestam's indicators when conducting our research. However, since the essence of a role-theoretical analysis is to read how states perceive themselves and their scope of action, it was primarily formulations that described Sweden as a state or suggested expectation of Sweden's role in international contexts that were of significant interest in our analysis. In the material, this was often expressed through wordings about what Sweden is or does and expectations of what Sweden *should be* or *should be doing*. This is to be regarded as a specification of Aggestam's indicators. The function remains the same: to identify the parts of the material that express Sweden's role beliefs and expectations.

In designing this study's analytical model, we place ourselves between the inductive and the deductive approaches. Our method is deductive in that we use previous research to identify the role typology presented below. Previous research and theories are thus of importance for the analysis. At the same time, we have chosen not to design any precise indicators, which means that the analysis is also considered inductive. An advantage of developing more precise indicators in advance would be that the material could have been more easily categorised in an analysis chart along with the various indicators. At the same time, this means that much of the analytical is done based on theory and not empirical data.

We find this less appropriate to apply to our research since we are primarily interested in what empiricism has to say about the change in Swedish security and foreign policy concerning role theory and the role set presented below. In the analysis section, the meaning of the various foreign policy roles is discussed, and whether they have changed over time. These roles are at the centre of the analysis.

#### 4.3 THE STUDY'S ANALYSIS MODEL

Based on what has been presented about Lisbeth Aggestam's role theory, will the study consist of the following typology:

##### *Independent*

This role can be found in previous research on Swedish foreign policy (Dalsjö, 2010; Andrén, 2002; Rieker, 2006) and Aggestam's (2004) role set. The role includes *commitments*, *duties*, *functions*, and *obligations* aimed at maintaining an independent and dynamic foreign policy where national interest is emphasised (Aggestam, 2004:79). The role includes positions to achieve freedom of action and credibility through a retained policy of neutrality.

##### *Contributor to peace and security*

The role consists of positions that aim to counteract threats to peace and security. It relates to the *commitments*, *duties*, *functions*, and *obligations* that decision-makers perceive in terms of European stability, conflict prevention, and peaceful conflict management (Aggestam, 2004:79). Human rights and democratisation issues are also included in this role.

##### *Leader*

The state is expected to have a special responsibility and to assume a leadership role. The role prescribes how decision-makers perceive influence and relate to power (Aggestam, 2004:79).

##### *Pro-European partnership*

This role aims at the *commitments*, *duties*, *functions*, and *obligations* that policymakers articulate towards EU's common security and foreign policy, as well as how the quality of cooperation and integration with the EU's standard policy is perceived (Aggestam, 2004:78).

### *Advocates for a wider Europe*

This role includes *commitments, duties, functions, and obligations* aimed towards policy-makers pledge towards the enlargement of the European Union (Aggestam, 2004:78).

### *Non-alignment collaborators*

This role includes *commitments, duties, functions, and obligations* aimed at increased security and foreign policy cooperation; this at the same time as the military non-alignment is being upheld. The role of non-alignment collaborators differs from the role of independence and neutrality, as the policy of neutrality and the pursuit of freedom of action are not of primary interest. Instead, international security and foreign policy cooperation are advocated as long as it does not threaten military non-alignment.

The analysis will partly focus on studying what meaning and importance are attributed to the various roles over time, but also whether Sweden assumes different or more roles in individual foreign policy issues. We want to emphasise that the model of analysis is to be regarded as a typology. We hence apply a partially open approach to the material. An open attitude means that the study is, to a greater extent, guided by the content of the text rather than the analysis model itself. This means a greater degree of freedom in the analysis and the conclusion as the answer to the research questions is guided by what is found in the material and not in any predefined categories (Esaiaasson et al., 2012:217). Since we have defined a role set based on previous research, our analysis model is also to be partly predefined. However, there are no purely categorised categories in which the material must be contained, but rather analytical benchmarks to enable a systematic examination of the material. Without some predefined categories, the study would risk losing credibility and probably be subject to the same criticism as the constructive and inductive approaches previously discussed.

## 5. METHODOLOGY

The following chapter begins with a discussion of the comparative case study as the chosen research design. Then qualitative text analysis is presented as the study's chosen method. Furthermore, the empirical data from which the study is based are also presented here. The choice of method, data gathering, sampling, and delimitations are also described in the chapter. The reader will have a detailed understanding of the choice of method and the selection process and what shortcomings and challenges that the study may encounter.

### 5.1 RESEARCH DESIGN

Since the purpose of the study is to investigate the possible change in Swedish security and foreign policy that developed after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008, we consider a *comparative case study design* to be useful (George and Bennet, 2005:151). For this study, the term case study will be based on the terminology from Arend Lijphart, which concentrations on a single case model (Lijphart, 1971:686). The study will, therefore, apply a *diachronic comparison* where Swedish foreign declarations between 2006-2011 will be compared with each other to see a possible change in Swedish foreign and security policy. Comparative studies are thus a method used by researchers who want to compare two or more cases with each other (George and Bennet, 2005:151). What is crucial in comparative studies is what is compared and in what way it is done. Also, essential to keep in mind is how the comparison will be understood for the reader, and therefore the material used needs to be significant for the study. In this way, it allows the researcher to achieve a broader and deeper analysis that increases the understanding of the research (Denk, 2002:7).

The central goal of the case study is not to comment on other cases. The purpose is instead to go into depth in a specific case (Rieker, 2006:14-15). As the study already uses existing theories to explain a specific case, the study is considered to be *theory-confirming*. Since the choice of cases has been decisive for the study, and not the theories themselves, the study is to be regarded as *theory-confirming* or *theory-infirming* and not theory-testing (Lijphart, 1971:692). This means that external validity is not of primary interest. Instead, the focus is on explaining why it became and how it became to be in this particular case (Esaiasson et al., 2012:89-90). However, we would like to emphasise, as mentioned above, that the study is not a pure case study in the sense that a specific case is being studied at one point in time. Instead, a comparison is made over time, which generated several units of analysis.

The study can thus be described as a comparative study based on the case of Sweden and Swedish security and foreign policy (Esaiasson et al., 2012:109). Finally, we would like to point out that we have chosen to do a comparative case study on how Swedish foreign and security policy has been affected by the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. We find it interesting to examine the dynamics between Sweden's role in the international political arena and on the domestic arena and how they affect each other. *Most similar systems design* (MSSD) is today a common method used by researchers in comparative politics. MSSD allows researchers to investigate different forms of relationships between independent and dependent variables and is therefore suitable for different types of issues. MSSD is also suitable when the purpose of the research is not so much to find the cause of a particular phenomenon, but instead, it wants to explain it by studying an exciting phenomenon and better try to understand something of its nature (Peters, 1998:56). In this case, with MSSD, we compare foreign declarations between 2006-2011, which are similar to several points to find events that can explain a difference between the foreign declarations. This strategy aims to identify the starting points that are different and explain the differences between foreign declarations that are otherwise equal (Denk, 2002:62).

That said, our study will apply a comparative case study over time, in other words, a diachronic comparison, but also the research design MSSD. The design will be useful in deciding whether the signing of the Lisbon Treaty marked a change in Swedish foreign and security policy.

## 5.2 RESEARCH METHOD

The method used by the study to review the empirical data and to achieve the purpose of the study is *qualitative text analysis*. According to Peter Esaiasson, Mikael Giljam, Henrik Oscarsson and Lena Wängnerud (2012), qualitative text analysis is suitable to apply to studies in which the essential content of texts is of interest, unlike quantitative text analysis where a larger number of logical units are treated equally and are assigned at the same weight (Esaiasson et al., 2012:211). As the study focuses on the possible change in Swedish security policy, from neutrality to solidarity, since the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008, foreign declaration from the Swedish government between 2006-2011 are analysed. Therefore, qualitative text analysis is preferred over quantitative methods. A quantitative content analysis would be appropriate if the purpose of the study were to investigate the occurrence and frequency of certain expressions in the material (Esaiasson et al., 2012:197). Such a method could not help answering the question of whether Sweden *has* switched to solidarity policy from neutrality, but rather answering questions about *how often* and *by whom* (Esaiasson et al., 2012:198).

It is crucial in text analysis to be able to systematically observe and interpret the material that forms the basis for the study (Rieker, 2006:19-20; Breuning, 2011:34-35). Studying conceptual variables such as role theory and identity to participate in the scientific debate and accumulate new knowledge requires a clear analytical framework and transparency. Constructivist, inductive, investigations without clear analytical frameworks are problematic in this aspect since an obvious risk with such investigations is that the individual researcher's knowledge and interpretations of the material become crucial to the study's results (Breuning, 2011:34). This problem is preferably avoided by a clear and transparent analysis model based on previous research. In order to solve the overall research problem and answer the questions, it is, therefore, essential to specify the number of questions to be asked in the material. It is these issues that form the analytical model on which the material is interpreted and analysed (Esaiasson et al., 2012:215-16). From a validity point of view, it is relevant to base the study on previous research in order to gain inspiration on how the questions in the analysis model can be formulated. It is likely that in previous research, researchers have been devoted to designing different models of analysis, and it would be ignorant not to take these aspects into account. Previous issues can be reused as they are reformulated or corrected to fit in the research are that are relevant to the thesis (Esaiasson et al., 2012:215).

### 5.3 SAMPLING

In Ulf Bjereld (1989) doctoral thesis is Sweden's Middle Eastern policy examined and how it has changed over time (Bjereld, 1989:12-13). In the analysis is the material, Sweden's action, divided into verbal and non-verbal actions concerning the 'Middle Eastern question' (Bjereld, 1989:13). Verbal behaviour is analysed through official statements, while non-verbal behaviour is analysed through Sweden's position and voting procedure in the UN. Based on Bjereld's division into verbal and non-verbal behaviour, will we, in our study, focus on Sweden's verbal behaviour with the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. We find official statements as an appropriate material since the purpose of our study is to explain, based on role theory, the change in Swedish foreign and security policy after the declaration of solidarity signing. Studying how Sweden votes in a different context would not give an equally in-depth picture of Sweden's role, opinions, and actions and will, therefore, not be included in our research.

The reason we have chosen to focus on verbal behaviour is that we want to investigate the Swedish attitude based on documents that have been carefully designed to convey Sweden's opinions and ambitions.

This approach analyses the image that decision-makers themselves choose to give (Bjereld, 1989:36). Since the purpose of the study is to research the possible change in Swedish foreign and security policy after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, we find it appropriate that the study is limited to focusing on what the decision-makers and the government, want to convey. The material, therefore, consists of the government's annual foreign declarations to the Parliament in which the incumbent government presents its ambitions and goals for Sweden's foreign, security, aid, and trade policy for the coming year. The foreign declaration is thus regarded as Sweden's declared foreign policy, which the government undertakes to follow during the year (Regeringen, 2015). The choice to only analyse foreign declarations is also based on Aggestam's study. In her thesis, she analyses official documents such as government declaration from Britain, France, and Germany to get a clear and reliable insight into the country's foreign and security policies that the incumbent government will follow during the upcoming year. Further, by studying the foreign declarations over time, a picture is created of the decision-makers and also the government's ideas and positions in foreign and security policy. The study is thus regarded as a central player regarding how Sweden is seen as a player on the international political arena. This differs from idea-centric studies where the focus is on the ideas themselves, regardless of who expresses them (Esaiasson et al., 2012:218).

#### 5.4 RELIABILITY

In order for a study to be considered to have good reliability, random measurement errors and sources of error must be eliminated. In a quantitative study, accuracy in the calculation of the results is essential, and in a qualitative study like ours, the researcher's accuracy in interpretation of the material is crucial. Another essential detail to note is that every step of the study must be done. Skipping any step in the process may result in random errors (Esaiasson et al., 2012:67). In order to avoid low reliability, we have been careful and clear when compiling the analysis tool. Reliability also increases as we use direct quotes from the chosen material. The interpretation problem always exists in a qualitative study, but the direct citation allows the reader to see our material first-hand. We also chose to read and analyse the foreign declarations separately to decide then later whether we made a similar interpretation of the material. As we did this, and that we in most cases came to the same conclusion, the analysis strengthened the reliability since two people went through the same material and obtained the same result. In the cases where we found different interpretations, we had to think about how the material would be interpreted and go back to the purpose of the analysis tool. This helped us achieve a regular and reliable result, which ultimately strengthened the study's reliability.

## 5.5 DELIMITATIONS

The study is limited to dealing with foreign declaration during the period 2006-2011. The reason why the year 2006 is the starting point is that this is the year where the discussion about the Lisbon Treaty took its toll. It was also during this time where the policy of neutrality began to lose importance. In the demarcation, we have taken into account the years both before and after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. By taking off in the foreign declaration of 2006, a solid picture of Sweden's foreign and security policy is created until the Lisbon Treaty was signed. The study thus includes material from both the time before and after the adaptation of the treaty.

## 5.6 FOREIGN DECLARATIONS TEMPLATE

This study is based on material from the foreign declarations dictated between the years 2006-2011. During these years, a shift not only between the foreign ministers but also the political direction of the sitting government has occurred. We have therefore chosen to make an overall template of the material, which in turn is essential, because any changes in opinion may be due to the political arbitration. It is vital to understand that the foreign and security policy, which is written in the foreign declarations are based on the sitting government's political starting points, and not the Parliament as a whole. We are aware that the majority of foreign declarations are from a centre-right government and that this can be seen as partial. We would, therefore, like to clarify that the study is not about examining whether Swedish foreign and security policy has changed depending on who the incumbent government is. Instead, the purpose is to investigate the change in the view of Swedish foreign and security policy with the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. The ideological orientation of the incumbent government is, therefore, not of great importance for the analysis.

**The foreign declarations used in our study consist of the following:**

*Template 1. Foreign Declarations 2006-2011*

<i>YEAR</i>	<i>SITTING GOVERNMENT</i>	<i>FOREIGN MINISTER</i>
2006	Social Democrats	Laila Freivalds
2007	Moderate Party	Carl Bildt
2008	Moderate Party	Carl Bildt
2009	Moderate Party	Carl Bildt
2010	Moderate Party	Carl Bildt
2011	Moderate Party	Carl Bildt



## 6. RESULT AND ANALYSIS

The study's results are here presented based on the research question and answered by an analysis of foreign declarations from the Swedish government between the years 2006-2011. The theoretical framework has been the basis for the analysis and is used to determine how the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 has affected Swedish security and foreign policy. The analysis is structured according to each role category. Under each subheading, we discuss what meaning is attributed to the role and whether this has changed over time. A concluding discussion follows the analysis chapter in chapter seven.

### 6.1 SWEDEN'S ROLE AS INDEPENDENT

The role of independent, or neutral, is partly challenging to find specific in the foreign declarations between 2006-2011. In the early 1990s, Sweden's foreign and security policy was characterized by the principle of neutrality, and Sweden worked actively to remain independent in conflicts. By the end of the Cold War, Sweden began to approach the European Union and thereby increasingly abandon its role as an independent. The former rigid neutrality policy was then replaced by a more open approach to international cooperation as Sweden approached the EU. During the mid-2000s, it was emphasised that the change of neutrality policy was aimed at strengthening Sweden's national interests and objectives (Regeringen, 2006). The following wording on Swedish security policy from the 2006 foreign declaration symbolizes the change in the meaning of the role of independent and neutral:

The military non-alignment gives us both the independence of our international commitment needs and the opportunity to participate in international cooperation for peace and security. It has been an advantage for Sweden and our security that there has been great agreement on the Swedish security policy line /.../ The government wants to strengthen the European Union as a global foreign and security policy player (Regeringen, 2006).

The quotation indicated a big change in the Swedish policy of neutrality. The Swedish role perception at the time was affirming neutrality and Sweden's independence at the same time as the membership of the EU advocated an increased foreign and security policy cooperation. The quote reflects not only the role of independent but also the roles of pro-European partner and non-alignment collaborator. The fact that these roles are found alongside the role of independence indicates that Sweden at the time occupied different roles concerning European cooperation.

At the same time, the Swedish military non-alignment and the principle of neutrality continued to be present in Swedish foreign and security policy. In 2007, the then centre-right Foreign Minister Carl Bildt expressed the following lines:

During the latter part of the past century, it was this endeavour that led the policy that was often called the policy of neutrality /.../ The development and formulation of our foreign and security policy must continue to take place in broad national consensus. Sweden is militarily non-aligned. Our country's future security is based on community and cooperation with other countries (Regeringen, 2007).

These wordings show that the role of independence has continued into the 21st century, including the principle of neutrality, still existed in Swedish foreign and security policy, but alongside the military non-alignment. However, the wording also indicated the change in Swedish foreign and security policy and thus the step away from neutrality and towards solidarity. Neutrality is seen to have served Sweden well and that this should not be forgotten, but it is now new foreign policy roles that are approaching Sweden that will serve a better purpose than the role of independence. Another step away from neutrality and towards solidarity came with the Swedish Declaration of Solidarity which in turn ascended with the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. The declaration of solidarity expressed during the 2000s had been incompatible with Swedish foreign and security policy based on the previous principle of neutrality. This leads us to the conclusion that the role of independent must have changed or faded over time in order to enable the declaration of solidarity under the Lisbon Treaty.

The formulation of Sweden as military non-aligned in peace aiming at neutrality in the event of war existed during the 20th century. Not until the 2000s did a clear change in how Sweden views itself as independent and neutral appear. The role of a non-alignment collaborator was thereby given a more prominent position during this time. The 2007 foreign declaration emphasises that Sweden's future security is based on community and cooperation with other countries (Regeringen, 2007). The freedom of military non-alignment remains, but the role of independent and neutral is of little importance at this time in Swedish foreign and security policy. Instead, it is the role of a non-alignment collaborator that influences Sweden's actions and self-image. During the years 2008-2011, Swedish neutrality is mentioned little to nothing in the foreign declarations, and it is therefore seen as Sweden left the role of independent with the signing of the Lisbon Treaty.

## 6.2 SWEDEN' ROLE AS CONTRIBUTOR TO PEACE AND SECURITY

The role of Sweden as a contributor to peace and security can be seen throughout the material. The role has its starting point in the political strategies based on non-alignment, where cooperation between different organisations will benefit Sweden's security policy the most. In the foreign declaration from 2006, it is stated that:

With the non-alignment as a basis, we pursue active and secure security policy with increasing efforts for military and civilian crisis management and credible disarmament work. Sweden is active in the UN, the EU, and in our immediate area. Sweden is as well active in the Middle East and Africa. Our [Sweden's] ambitions to mediate, and the number of particular envoys increases. We strengthen the work for increased dialogue between cultures. Sweden advocates a broad policy with human rights at the centre (Regeringen, 2006).

Laila Freivalds stated here that the government wants to pursue an active and secure security policy, and that it is vital to strengthen the European Union as a global foreign and security policy player. The role Sweden has as a contributor to peace and security is also seen as a part of being a leader in the political arena. The government wants to pursue a close relationship with different organisations regarding security questions. Sweden advocates closer cooperation in the EU and a lever for foreign and security policy, and Freivalds emphasises that they will do this without hesitating to raise their voice (Regeringen, 2006).

Furthermore, the elevated cooperation can be seen to increase over time, and Carl Bildt states in the 2007 foreign declaration that it is because of a "fundamentally new stage in foreign and security policy since the early 1990s" (Regeringen, 2007). Sweden aims to welcome a new German treaty that will elaborate on the European Union's foreign and security policy. According to Bildt, this is a step forward towards the already important European cooperation that Freivalds discussed in 2006. In 2007, the Swedish government emphasised continued importance on their participation in the Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) and their work towards crisis management. During this period, Sweden has and will continue to keep its role as one international peacekeeper and focuses only on peace support operations. Bildt ends his 2007 foreign declaration with a list of priorities that the government will focus on, with one of them being Sweden as a global voice for peace in the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Regeringen, 2007).

In the 2008 foreign declaration, Carl Bildt accentuates the importance of the reform treaty that has given the European Union a step towards a future improved foreign and security policy. Bildt states that this treaty “open ups new possibilities and tears down the old border” (Regeringen, 2008). He divides the declaration up between the different priorities that he talked about in 2007 and describes how they have worked with them in the past year and what is yet to come. In the foreign declaration from 2007, Bildt declares that:

Sweden must be a driving force in the development of the European Union as a global player, not least in terms of peace and security policy. We [Sweden] want to work for the European Union, through a broad and effective foreign policy, to be well equipped to meet the global challenges facing Europe and the world. On this basis, we also want to strengthen transatlantic cooperation (Regeringen, 2007).

According to this statement, in 2008, Sweden focuses on the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, and therefore they expand their part as a contributor to peace and security. The treaty implies a broader connected Europe and Sweden will take a full part in this reformation. A step towards the loss of the non-alignment policy came therefor after the treaty. Sweden had evolved and changed direction to a more solidarity policy. In the foreign declaration, it is stated that Sweden will not react passively if a disaster or an attack would hit another member state of the European Union. This broad agreement is based on community and cooperation with other countries, and this, in turn, implies that Sweden takes on the role of a contributor to peace and security (Regeringen, 2008).

The role of a contributor to peace and security includes conflict prevention and peace promotion efforts. Sweden’s opportunities to participate in international cooperation and efforts, especially with the EU and NATO, increased as the meaning of the role of independent and neutral changed in the 1990s. Therefore, in 2009, Sweden takes on more responsibility in the European Union and chooses to focus on becoming a central part of the organisation. It is declared in the foreign declaration that:

It is a responsibility that we will bear with the firm conviction that the European Union is also the best platform for Sweden foreign policy action. This is one of the reasons why Sweden has chosen to be at the heart of the European Union (Regeringen, 2009).

It is clearly specified that Sweden is starting to take a more active approach in conflicts by involving themselves more in the European Union's work. In 2009, the Swedish government emphasised that they want to end the Gaza isolation since it is neither humanely defensible nor politically acceptable. Bildt states that Sweden also wants to strengthen its efforts for a comprehensive peace in the Israeli region. They want to do this by cooperating with the EU and the United States (Regeringen, 2009).

In the foreign declarations in both 2010 and 2011, it is specified that Sweden will keep on focusing on building relationships with other countries. The 2010 foreign declaration is the first one under the Lisbon Treaty, and therefore Bildt pinpoints the fact that the Swedish foreign and security policy will reflect the reforms in the treaty. Within the European Union, Sweden will contribute to peace and crisis management in countries in need, and Bildt highlights that:

Our European Union - following Article 49 of the Treaty - remains open to all European countries that want and can live up to the requirements of full participation in our cooperation. The European Union has a particular interest and responsibility for the development of our neighbouring countries in the East as well as in the South. Europe's peace policy in the immediate area strengthens out the continent's stability and credibility in the global arena (Regeringen, 2010).

According to this statement, Sweden will contribute to a stronger and more open society and apply this on peace support to other countries. The role as a contributor to peace and security is shown in this declaration by Bildt, through the affirming of different conflicts that Sweden will engage in. For example, Sweden will be implicated in the conflict in Iraq by focusing on the rebuilding of the country and civilian and military operations in Afghanistan (Regeringen, 2010). In 2011 therefore, Bildt accentuated that "the European voice is needed in the world. Moreover, Sweden's voice is needed in Europe" (Regeringen, 2011). With this, Bildt stresses that the fact that Sweden is now and forth in the future is to become a more extraordinary leader in the questions regarding peace and security. Sweden will, at the time, henceforth be a centre actor as a contributor to a more peaceful world, by doing so they will not only be a contributor to peace and security but also occupy themselves as a leader on the international political arena (Regeringen, 2011).

### 6.3 SWEDEN' ROLE AS LEADER

The meaning of the role of a leader has been relatively intact for Sweden over the years. Sweden sees itself as a leading player in the UN system and in contributing to peace and security worldwide. What happens, on the other hand, is that Sweden, with its memberships in the EU, is gradually starting to present itself as a leading player in the Union's enlargement and efforts to strengthen EU crisis management and peace-promoting activities.

In the foreign declarations between the years, 2006 to 2008, Sweden does not formally stand out as the role of a leader on foreign and security policies. However, their main activity as a leader is focused on humanitarian and aid work in the world. Freivalds discusses Sweden's aid work in the declaration from 2006, and there she points-out the fact that:

Sweden is now building modern development cooperation that is based on a rights perspective and the poor's perspective. We [Sweden] only work with countries that have a poverty reduction policy in place. The cooperation is based on respect for human rights, good governance and democratic processes (Regeringen, 2006).

Freivalds keeps on discussing, throughout the declaration, that the humanitarian work is the main priority for Sweden. Henceforth, Bildt elaborates Sweden's position in 2007 and explains that their major effort is now instead on becoming a main actor in the European Union. Bildt declares that Sweden keeps on working with their aid work but have now placed themselves as a front figure in this matter and can now put their effort on other more prioritised questions regarding foreign and security policy. Bildt explains this change of direction by stating that:

Today, it is a crucial task for Sweden to contribute to an even stronger European cooperation that makes the Union the force in the service of peace, freedom and reconciliation that the world is increasingly in need of (Regeringen, 2007).

Sweden also takes on the role of a leader by using their chairman position in the European Council to take stand against not respecting human rights. People are being mistreated all over the world, and therefore Sweden wants to act on this problematic. Due to this, Sweden wants to take advantage of its leading role in the organisation in order to make society more tolerable for everyone (Regeringen, 2007). Furthermore, in 2008, Sweden took on a more active role in creating new instruments and generating broader discussion on the further development of the common European security strategy. Sweden, based on its prerequisites, contributes to the

European Union's solidarity security. In the first half-year of 2008, Bildt emphasises that Sweden will be the lead nation for the Nordic Battle Group, which is one of the two rapid response forces available to the EU. Furthermore, in 2008, Bildt also states that Sweden pushed for the imposition of more effective sanctions towards countries in need, and that "this is a work that will continue to be a high priority in the future" (Regeringen, 2008).

The role of a leader came to a turning point for Sweden in 2009. The year would circle significant political and economic challenges and therefore be more extensive and larger than in a very long time. Through its Presidency of the European Union, Sweden was given a special responsibility to meet these challenges, which is something that Bildt underlines in the foreign declaration:

It is a responsibility that we will bear with a firm conviction that the European Union is also the best platform for Sweden's foreign policy action. This is one of the reasons why Sweden has chosen to be at the heart of the European Union (Regeringen, 2009).

It is the government's goal, at the time, to enforce a successful and results-oriented presidency, and this would put Sweden's foreign policy to great tests. In 2009 the possibility existed that all Member states would ratify the Lisbon Treaty, and that meant that Sweden would take over the lead role of an organisation that is under institutional uncertainty. Bildt emphasises that there would be many changes during the year and therefore affect not only Sweden but the whole Union (Regeringen, 2009).

The foreign declaration in 2010, is the first one under the Lisbon Treaty, and this is mirrored throughout the declaration. Sweden is now part of the heart of European cooperation, and this is seen as a natural and desirable development. They aim to make the Union's voice in the world clearer and this because national interest and values are thereby best safeguarded in an increasingly complex world. Sweden's took over the role as president of the European Union during a time of great challenges, such as a massive financial crisis. Over the past year, Sweden focused on bringing the Union back around to a better place. However, even though challenges were faced, they managed to keep the ratification of the Treaty in place, and the implementation could begin. Bildt describes in the foreign declaration that:

It was a heavy responsibility for our country, as President of the Union, to complete ratification and to begin the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, at the same time as the new Commission was to be elected and the newly elected European Parliament. We showed that we are committed and competent Europeans. We [Sweden] pushed our Union's agenda forward on essential points (Regeringen, 2010).

Bildt keeps on, in the declaration, referring to the Union as "ours" and that it is crucial to point out that Sweden is a vital actor in the organisation. In the declaration, he states the many negotiations and commitments that Sweden, as president of the Union, has been involved in. He continues to explain how they managed to either settle them or make a plan for further progressive work (Regeringen, 2010). The 2011 foreign declaration continues in the same line of thinking as the one from 2010. Sweden will focus on its humanitarian aid work and their progression to be in the heart of the European Union. The image is further highlighted, which is manifested on the 2011 foreign declaration, where Bildt clearly emphasises that Sweden is a humanitarian superpower (Regeringen, 2011).

The connotation of the role of a leader is comparatively intact over the years. Sweden sees itself as a leading player in the UN and in subsidising to peace and security worldwide. There is also an assurance to disarmament and combat weapon. Sweden, with its membership in the EU, is gradually starting to present itself as a leading player in the Union's enlargement and efforts to strengthen the EU's crisis management and peace promotion activities (Regeringen, 2006). One explanation for this is the fact that Sweden has brought the role of a leading player with them in the promotion of peace and security into European cooperation. The leading determinations for expulsion have slightly faded over time, and Sweden increasingly sees itself as a leading player in humanitarian efforts, aid work, environmental policies and foreign security (Regeringen, 2008).



#### 6.4 SWEDEN'S ROLE AS PRO-EUROPEAN PARTNER

The role of pro-European partner has emerged more and more prominent in Swedish foreign and security policy in the mid-2000s. In the 2006 foreign declaration, foreign and security policy cooperation in the EU is described as “a lever for our [Sweden's] foreign and security policy” (Regeringen, 2006). The Government thus sees EU policy as an extension of Swedish policy. It intends to work to deepen cooperation to strengthen the EU as a global foreign and security policy player (Regeringen, 2006). Furthermore, during the second half of the 2000s, the pro-European trend holds its own, and Sweden attaches great importance to European cooperation and, at the same time, sees itself as a leading player. The foreign declaration from 2007 contains the following statement: “Sweden shall be at the heart of European cooperation /.../ The cooperation within the European Union occupies a special position in Swedish foreign and security policy” (Regeringen, 2007). At this time, Sweden aims to lead the development of the standard European foreign and security policy to strengthen the EU as a global player (Regeringen, 2007). Carl Bildt also states in the 2007 foreign declaration that the Government gives special priority that Sweden must be a driving force in the development of the European Union as a global player, not least in terms of peace and security policy. Through a priority list, Bildt concludes:

Sweden wants to work for the EU through a broad and effective foreign policy, that is well equipped to meet the global challenges facing Europe and the world. On this basis, we also want to strengthen transatlantic cooperation (Regeringen, 2007).

In the 2008 foreign declaration, Bildt continues on the priority list he declared the year before:

The Lisbon Treaty means that significantly better conditions are created for the European Union to function as an increasingly strong global player, also in terms of peace and security policy /.../ Sweden will play an active role in creating the new instruments that the Treaty is now preparing for (Regeringen, 2008).

Note the last bit of the precise sentence, “Sweden will play an active role in creating the new instruments that the Treaty is now preparing for.” The Lisbon Treaty is not only prescribed with arguments about what Sweden has to gain but also on what Sweden has to provide to the EU and the Treaty. This shows that Sweden partly sees itself as a robust European partner but also indicates that Sweden has the highest ambitions and does not see itself as a passive partner in EU cooperations.

Further, Sweden has, at the time, initiated a broad discussion on the additional development of the common European security strategy. A safer and more peaceful Europe means improved conditions for peace and security for Sweden (Regeringen, 2008). In 2009, Sweden took office as President of the European Union, and with this, international cooperation was put to the test, and Sweden was given a special responsibility to meet the challenges that came with the presidency.

It is a responsibility that we [Sweden] will shoulder with the firm conviction that the European Union is also the best platform for Sweden's foreign policy action. This is one of the reasons why Sweden has chosen to be at the heart of the European Union (Regeringen, 2009).

The commitment and support that Sweden has shown during the earlier declarations are also seen in the latter and especially in the foreign declarations from 2009, which is emphasised in the statement above. It is also during this declaration that the Lisbon Treaty is increasingly mentioned, and the support for the Treaty is described as strong, both in the Parliament and the Government. It is explained as a treaty that creates better conditions for the European Union to act uniformly and more vigorously in the global arena by bringing together the Union's foreign policy funds in one place (Regeringen, 2009). With the Lisbon Treaty, support for the EU is seen to increase, and thus Sweden is taking a more significant step away from neutrality and towards solidarity. The role of the pro-European partner is therefore seen more prominent in the later 2000s, with the Lisbon Treaty came hence the role to influence the Swedish foreign and security policy.

The support for the EU continued in 2010, which was the first foreign declaration under the Lisbon Treaty. Bildt explains that the Treaty has given Europe and Sweden new opportunities to shape international development based on European interests and values (Regeringen, 2010). The membership in the European Union means that Sweden is a part of a political alliance and takes joint responsibility for Europe's security. It is during the 2010 foreign declaration that the Lisbon Treaty's solidarity clause is mentioned for the first time through the statement, "Sweden will not react passively if a disaster or an attack would hit another member country or Nordic country. We expect these countries to act in the same way if Sweden is affected" (Regeringen, 2010). For Sweden, which has chosen to be at the heart of European cooperation, the solidarity clause is seen as a natural and desirable development. This is how Sweden's values and national interests are safeguarded in an increasingly complex world.

The Lisbon Treaty was in 2011 fully implemented in Swedish foreign and security policy, which is continuously mentioned in the foreign declaration at the time. The role of pro-European partner can, therefore, be seen as fully developed, and the Swedish membership in the European cooperation is seen as stronger than ever by the Government at the time (Regeringen, 2011). Which is prominent in the following statement:

Sweden is well placed to make a constructive contribution to European challenges in the European cooperation. The European Union under the new Treaty has been given greater opportunities to influence the development of the world according to our [Sweden's] values and interests. Now we must use and develop these opportunities, for the benefit of a world of peace and freedom (Regeringen, 2011).

The role of pro-European partners includes ambitions to develop, expand, and steer the EU in a direction desirable for Sweden. The role has great influence in Sweden's foreign and security policy during the 2000s, this together with the role of non-alignment collaborator. In the foreign declaration of 2008, this connection is clear when the Government states that "the connection between our [Sweden's] security policy and our European policy is as clear as it is important" (Regeringen, 2008). This development continues throughout the late 2000s, and in the 2011 foreign declaration, the Government argues that Sweden, in its quest to belong to the core of the European Union, best utilizes Sweden's national interests and promotes Swedish universal values (Regeringen, 2011). In this formulation, the role of a pro-European partner, together with the role of a non-alignment collaborator, has replaced the previous function of neutrality policy as a tool for strengthening and promoting Sweden's interests.

All in all, the role of pro-European partner receives little attention during 2006. One possible explanation for this is that the approach to NATO takes focus when it comes to Sweden's foreign and security policy. It is then in the 2007 foreign declaration that the role of the pro-European partner is revitalized by the dictating of the Lisbon Treaty. In 2008 and 2009, European cooperation is highlighted as an essential and significant part of Swedish foreign and security policy, which also takes concrete expression in the form of cooperation on defence and security policy through the solidarity clause. This role is therefore seen as an important one in Swedish foreign and security due to the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty during the late 2000s and the beginning of the 2010s.

## 6.5 SWEDEN'S ROLE AS ADVOCATES FOR A WIDER EUROPE

The role of advocate for a wider Europe is a role seen throughout the research period. The role was evident in increased democratization and integration with the rest of Europe. The role of advocate for a wider Europe is also about Sweden fighting for Europe's expansion, which is not least seen in the following statement from the foreign declaration from 2006:

The enlargement of the EU strengthens our security, and more countries are getting a neighbour who contributes to peace and democracy. The government is looking forward to welcoming Bulgaria and Romania as members, hopefully from next year (Regeringen, 2006).

Laila Freivalds states at the time that the government continues and will continue to push for Europe's enlargement. "The EU is a peace project, not historically but also for the 21st century" (Regeringen, 2006). Sweden's advocate work is also seen through the approach to the Balkan countries, where the opportunity to approach the EU provided incentives for reforms and peaceful cooperation. It was also seen as a great success that Croatia was allowed to start negotiating membership and that Macedonia, where Anna Lindh and Javier Solana four years earlier actively helped to avert a civil war, was granted candidate country status. The EU perspective is also seen as central when Kosovo's status was to be negotiated during the year (Regeringen, 2006). Although the role of advocate for a wider Europe is seen in the 2006 foreign declaration, it is not until Carl Bildt's first foreign declaration in 2007 that the role sets a strong mark in Swedish foreign policy. This is something that continues through the rest of the 2000s and at the beginning of the 2010s.

During 2007 is every enlargement of the Union seen as a subject for discussion as each enlargement has led to the Union becoming a stronger force for peace, freedom, and democracy not only in Europe but also globally. Sweden stands, at the time, for a Union that remains open to all European democracies that meet the demands of membership. As a continuation of the foreign declaration, the year before did Sweden welcome Bulgaria and Romania as members of the European Union (Regeringen, 2007). The role of an advocate for a wider Europe is often seen together with the role as a contributor to peace and security. This may not be strange as the early 2000s saw a democracy wave, which Sweden was very involved in when it comes to fighting for the democratization of Europe. With this wave, more potential members to the Union rose to the surface. That being said, note the following proclamation:

We [Sweden] assume that both the reform process in Turkey and the membership negotiations with the European Union will continue. A democratic and dynamic Turkey that fully respects the rights of individuals and minorities and firmly rooted in European integration strengthens the whole of Europe (Regeringen, 2007).

Sweden does, in other words, attach great importance to the work of developing and strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy. However, this policy cannot be seen as a substitute for those countries that eventually can and want to apply for EU membership, states Bildt. Sweden, therefore, advocates a wider Europe, but only for democracies. Sweden's foreign policy contributes to freedom, peace, and reconciliation, both in Sweden and in other parts of the world. This is based on clear values in the values that support Sweden's society and Sweden's interests. The work of promoting democracy, human rights, and sustainable developments permeates Swedish foreign policy (Regeringen, 2008).

The successive enlargement of the European Union is in the 2008 foreign declaration seen as a uniquely successful process. The enlargement of the Union has dramatically improved the conditions for peace and prosperity in Europe and created a model for peaceful cooperation and integration that inspires the world in general (Regeringen, 2008). Following the dictation of the Lisbon Treaty, the role of advocate for a wider Europe becomes even more evident in Sweden's foreign and security policy priorities. The 2008 foreign declaration emphasises the importance of broader European cooperation, which is stated in the following sentence: "Keeping enlargement alive and thus opening the door to Europe for the countries of our [Sweden's] region aspiring to membership is one of the Union's main strategic obligations" (Regeringen, 2008).

The significance of the enlargement of the European Union is something that also continues during the 2009 foreign declaration. Here, too, the role of advocate for a wider Europe is seen together with the role of a contributor to peace and security. This is concretely seen in the following statement dictated by Bildt:

Enlargement remains the European Union's main instrument for creating security, democracy, and prosperity in Europe /.../ Sweden and the European Union support the negotiation process on the future of Cyprus. A reunited Cyprus means increased security, freedom, and welfare benefits for the entire island population and the region as a whole (Regeringen, 2009).

Many of the initiatives, including efforts for democracy in Turkey and the Western Balkans, the Lisbon Treaty and the summit on the European Union's peace and stability efforts indicate that Sweden works for the role as an advocate for a wider Europe, but also as a contributor for peace and security (Regeringen 2009). This role combination also exists in promoting substantial European integration in critical areas such as legislation, trade, and mobility. Sweden then sees itself as a leading player in the democratization of the former Eastern States and the implementation of the Eastern Partnership.

Even in the issue of Ukraine, Sweden gives a picture of the advocated of a wider Europe (Regeringen, 2010). In the 2010 foreign declaration, Ukraine's democratic development is of great importance "we [Sweden] hope that the negotiations on the new association agreement with the European Union will be completed during the year" (Regeringen, 2010). The wording is preceded by a paragraph, where Sweden, as advocates for the enlargement of the Union, is highlighted, which supports the government's ambition to work for more countries to become members of the EU. At the end of the 2000s, these images are further highlighted, which is clearly manifested in the foreign declaration in 2010 where then-Foreign Minister Carl Bildt points out that:

Our Europe shall be an open Europe / ... / Our European Union remains - in accordance with Article 49 of the Treaty - open for all the European countries who want and can live up to the requirements of full participation in our cooperation. We do not want to close doors to the future - we want to open opportunities (Regeringen, 2010).

The meaning of the role as an advocate for a wider Europe is relatively intact over the years. Sweden sees itself as a leading player in work for the enlargement of the EU and thereby the work for peace and democracy in Europe. The commitment to the Lisbon Treaty and the extension of the EU's power also remains. Sweden believes that the European Union's relations with its strategic partner countries create increased conditions for the values on which the Union is based. The Unions credibility is based on Sweden's coherence, Sweden's readiness to stand up for and drive the Union' Treaty and Sweden's ability to meet the economic challenges, and to contribute to freedom, peace, and security in our immediate area, which is clearly emphasised in the 2011 foreign declaration (Regeringen, 2011). Overall, it is the role of an advocate for a wider Europe distinguishable in Swedish foreign and security policy between 2006-2011, and the role sees a significant increase with the dictating of the Lisbon Treaty.

## 6.6 SWEDEN'S ROLE AS NON-ALIGNMENT COLLABORATOR

The role of a non-alignment collaborator often occurs together with several of the other roles. In the mid-2000s, the role is found in the fact that the military non-alignment gives Sweden both the independence that the Swedish international commitment needs to be able to participate in international cooperation for peace and security. Sweden took on the role of non-alignment collaborator when Sweden chose to stand outside defence cooperation involving nuclear weapons. This role concept is expressed verbatim in the 2006 foreign declaration:

The fact that Sweden is military non-alignment and thus stands outside defence cooperation that includes nuclear weapons strengthens our position in the fight against weapons of mass destruction. The threat from nuclear weapons persists and is also taking on new forms. Nuclear weapons states still rely on their vast arsenals (Regeringen, 2006).

In the meantime, the draft on security through cooperation is an essential part of Swedish foreign and security policy. The policy is seen as safe, active, and solidarity and rests based on military non-alignment. The 2006 foreign declaration states that “In order to meet the threats of today and tomorrow, the government wants to strengthen further international cooperation in foreign and security policy based on military non-alignment” (Government, 2006). With the non-alignment policy as a basis, Sweden pursues an active and secure security policy with increasing efforts for military and civilian crisis management and credible disarmament work. With the approach to the European Union in the 2000s and with the end of the Cold War in the late 1900s, Sweden was able to approach NATO. In this respect, the role of non-alignment collaborator was evident. In the 2007 foreign declaration, then-Foreign Minister Carl Bildt expresses precisely that role perception as follows:

In-depth cooperation with NATO in the field of crisis management is in Sweden's interest. As a partner country, we already have a broad commitment, focusing on joint crisis management efforts and military cooperation (Government, 2007).

During the years following Bildt's statement, Sweden continues to emphasise the importance of cooperation with NATO, while at the same time, Sweden repeatedly reiterates that military non-alignment remains the foundation of Swedish foreign and security policy. The role of non-alignment collaborator occurs during this period, together with the role of independent and neutral, which at the time includes both military non-alignment and the principle of neutrality in the event of war.

Following Sweden's accession to the EU in 1995, the role of non-alignment collaborator becomes even more evident in Sweden's foreign and security policy priorities. The 2007 foreign declaration emphasises the importance of international cooperation, as stated in the following statement in the declaration:

The development and design of our foreign and security policy must continue to take place in broad national consensus. Sweden has a policy of military non-alignment (Regeringen, 2008).

For the first time in the 2008 foreign declaration, the principle of solidarity, which today is Sweden's security policy line, is formulated:

There is a broad consensus that our [Sweden's] country's future security is based on community and cooperation with other countries. There is also a broad consensus that Sweden will not react passively if a disaster or an attack would hit another member state of the European Union or another Nordic country. This also includes an expectation that these countries will act in the same way if Sweden is affected (Regeringen, 2008).

This change in Sweden's role perception is evident here. The previous policy of neutrality aimed at Sweden's independence is here definitely replaced by its opposite. Instead, Sweden defines itself from the role of non-alignment collaborator, where collaboration with other countries is seen as crucial in order to achieve security. The fact that Sweden expresses solidarity with the EU and expects the same in exchange indicates that Sweden is characterized by the role of non-alignment collaborator in foreign and security policy. Note also this slightly short but precise sentence "Sweden has a policy of military non-alignment" (Regeringen, 2008). This is the only time non-alignment as foreign, and security policy is mentioned in the 2008 foreign declaration, which is a drastic change from the previous declarations.

Interestingly, the role of non-alignment changed in 2009-2011. The military non-alignment is not mentioned in the foreign declarations in those years. Instead, it is emphasised that Sweden's security is built jointly with other countries and organisations. In the foreign declaration from 2010 and 2011, Bildt emphasised the fact described above with the following words: "Membership in the European Union means that Sweden is part of a political alliance and takes joint responsibility for Europe's security" (Regeringen, 2010; 2011). It is noteworthy that for the first time, European cooperation is described as a political alliance, at the same time that the non-alignment is no longer mentioned in the foreign declaration.



## 7. DISCUSSION

The starting point for this study was the changes that have taken place in Swedish foreign and security policy since the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. There was no doubt that Sweden's foreign and security policy line had changed from neutrality to cooperation and solidarity. The solidarity statement that Sweden entered into served as clear empirical evidence that this was the case. The purpose of the study was, therefore, to contribute to an understanding of the changes in Swedish security and foreign policy after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008, as expressed in Swedish foreign declarations between 2006-2011. The following paragraphs discuss the conclusions that the analysis has resulted in and the explanations that the role-theoretical analysis has contributed to.

### 7.1 SUMMARY OF OUR RESULTS

A general summary of our result that also answers the research question is that role theory plays a significant part in the change of Swedish foreign and security policy. The analysis shows that the shift in policies depends on changes in the foreign policy roles, how the state views itself and their scope for action. The analysis revealed that what was previously attributed to the role of independent made it impossible for Swedish participation in both political and military alliances. However, the role was toned down over time, and more focus was given to the role of non-alignment collaborator, which gradually emerged as the role of independent was declining. This change helped Sweden to move away from the previous policy of neutrality and take a more active role in membership with the European Union. This conclusion supports Breuning's (2011) theory of *multiple roles* as it shows that Sweden acts from multiple roles and that Sweden successively abandons one role in favour of another.

Sweden's role change from independent to non-alignment collaborator may partly explain the change in Sweden's foreign and security policy, but it is not enough alone to explain the more expansive change. To get an answer to that question, we also need to study the change in other roles. The role of advocator for a wider Europe changed from initially getting very little room in foreign declarations, to later getting much more space in the debate with the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. Sweden then came to advocate for increased cooperation with the European Union, at the same time Sweden often mentioned in foreign declarations about the great significance of a more substantial EU. That the democratic wave in Europe was of the utmost importance as it led to a greater EU with more member states.

Sweden also came forward to advocate making Swedish politics the EU's common ground. In this context, Sweden saw itself as a leading player in the development of the EU's common foreign and security policy, under the Lisbon Treaty. That Sweden also expresses solidarity with both the EU and the Nordic countries based on these conditions also aims at the change in Sweden's role perception. From neutrality and non-alignment to solidarity.

The role of contributor to peace and security may not have much to say about why Sweden has gone from neutrality to solidarity. What is interesting, however, is that Sweden has chosen to channel its international involvement through the EU and at the same time work to achieve greater influence over the EU's joint commitments to get the Swedish values to become the EU's common. One conceivable conclusion based on that reasoning is that the role is integrated with the roles of pro-European partner and non-alignment collaborator, which in turn expands and strengthens the roles and makes Sweden's connections to the various collaborations stronger and more difficult to question. Here, too, the argument about *multiple roles* proves to be relevant as the analysis shows that Sweden occupies different roles in different political contexts.

The role of a leader can be seen throughout the declarations. Sweden takes a step forward in the discussion regarding the European Union's security and foreign policy. The role is especially noticeable when Sweden became the chairman of the European Council but also for its presidency. By putting much effort into peacekeeping measures, they have become a leading actor in both humanitarian and aid work. Sweden uses their well-established bond with organisations such as NATO, UN and the EU in order to get their political thoughts, based on solidarity and neutrality, across the international political arena. The Swedish governments work towards becoming a contributor to peace and security is only possible because of their position in the heart of the European Union.

The role of pro-European partner can more specifically demonstrate the change in Swedish foreign and security policy. The emergence and increased importance of this role pave the way for Sweden to sign the Lisbon Treaty with its associated solidarity clause. This change indicates that Sweden is increasingly defining itself as a big part of Europe and is adding one of its advocates for increased integration, especially concerning foreign and security policy. The fact that Sweden sees itself as a leader in the EU may also have contributed to the fact that Sweden's European policy aimed at deeper cooperation in the foreign and security policy area has gained

more room in the Swedish security policy debate. It is this role that most demonstrates the change in Swedish foreign and security policy between 2006-2011 and Sweden's step towards increased solidarity with the European Union.

The big conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis is that the role of independent had a strong attachment to Swedish foreign and security policy after the Cold War, but with the end of the Cold War, new doors were opened for the Swedish collaborations. Sweden then focused more on non-alignment and military non-alignment, which also had a strong attachment in Swedish foreign and security policy into the second half of the 2000s. However, there were traces of the role of independent in the 2000s, which can be seen in the 2006 foreign declaration. The more neutrality and the role of independent began to decline, and the more Sweden began to seek new roles, even beyond the role of non-alignment. The Lisbon Treaty is shown here as a turning point in Swedish foreign, and security policy as Sweden took a step away from the well-established non-alignment and a significant step towards solidarity and the role of pro-European partner.

## 7.2 OUR RESULTS IN RELATION TO LITERATURE REVIEW

The analysis has shown that there is no doubt that Sweden's foreign and security policy has changed from neutrality to solidarity. There is also a general conclusion that the different roles that Sweden take, all play a significant part in shaping the foreign and security policy. In the analysis, it is stated that Sweden uninterruptedly abandons one role in favour of another, and one influencing actor is indeed the union. It is essential to underline that the roles affect policies depending on how the state views itself and their scope of action. This is partly true; however, in the literature review, there is also a distinguished similarity between the European Union's line of action and its effect on the member states.

In the European Union, there has now become a greater Europeanization of the previously more nationally oriented security policy. Europeanization is a collection of approaches that, in turn, results in formal and informal rules that later on is implemented at the national level in the member states. Christiansen et al. (2013) presented a theoretical framework to identify if and how EU-level changes affect the member states national level. They describe that the Europeanization of the union, triggered by the Lisbon Treaty, not only impacted on the domestic structure but also led to a process of transnationalization and bureaucratisation. At various stages of this process, one can see that Sweden applies different role theories.

The fact that EU regulations and laws affect the member states institutions could result in an argument that their independence “diminishes”. The role of independent could be seen as diminished by the fact that Europeanization of the European Union and the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty led to the question on what is most important, the state or the union? After the Lisbon Treaty, the member states had to apply a standard foreign and security policy that intervened with their own. Despite this, since the European Union is based on an institution that cannot write or implemented laws without the majority of the member states approval, their independence could be seen as not being threatened.

In the domino effect process after the Europeanization, there are a few role theories that could be applied to both transnationalization and bureaucratisation. Transnationalization of parliamentary work is based on strengthening horizontal interaction among national parliaments and of the vertical interaction between parliaments and EU-level actors. The role of pro-European partnership and advocate for a wider Europe could be adapted to this stage of the process. Since transnationalization advocates for more interaction between member states, and since it states in the Swedish foreign declarations that they want to elaborate their relationship with other member states, this could affect these roles. On the other hand, the bureaucratisation is based on the parliamentary administration and their work with the union. It is not clear which of the roles that could be applied to this element; however, all of them are reliant on a well-functioning organisation. In order to achieve the foreign policy goals that are mentioned in Sweden’s foreign declarations, a good relationship with the European Union is needed. This is done by working closely with the parliamentary bureaucrats. The roles that Sweden will then take will be reflected through this excellent cooperation with the union.

Both Sweden and Finland have become more and more influenced by the EU through the growing and extensive Europeanization. However, previous literature shows that it is because of their open attitude towards the EU and NATO, that has, in turn, resulted in a transition from neutrality to a policy of solidarity. Finland has, in similarity to Sweden, shown a great interest in broader European cooperation. Based on the findings in the analysis, Finland could also be adapted to different roles. However, the role of leader could differ from Sweden’s. In the Swedish foreign declarations, it is clearly stated that they take the lead in different political discussion and after that act upon them. Finland, on the other hand, at least according to Leo G. Michel (2011), seems to be more adaptable to the union’s work.

They do not stand out in discussions regarding foreign and security policy, but rather focus on being a helping hand if member states are in need. The Finnish government was strongly for the treaty being implemented, in the same way as Sweden, and this resulted in Finland gaining a stronger relationship with the European Union. Therefore, after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, they have become increasingly involved, which means that the various roles are now also applied to them. They want to work for more cross-border work and, together with the member states, to develop more transparent security and foreign policy that will permeate the entire European Union.

### 7.3 CONCLUSIONS

It is stated in every foreign declaration after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty that:

The membership in the European Union means that Sweden is part of a political alliance and takes joint responsibility for Europe's security. Sweden will not react passively if a disaster or an attack would hit another member country or Nordic country. We expect these countries to act in the same way if Sweden is affected.

This broadly summarises the view that Sweden has on itself, which is clearly seen when analysing the foreign declarations. Based on the analyses and the discussion above, it is possible to see a change in Swedish foreign and security policy after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. We can, therefore, continue to answer the study's research question "How has the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 affected Swedish foreign and security policy, as expressed in Swedish foreign declarations between 2006-2011?". The signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 has affected Swedish security and foreign policy in many ways. However, the biggest one seen to the foreign declarations is that Sweden has undergone a transformation from neutrality and military non-alignment to solidarity. This conclusion is drawn based on that the role of independent and non-alignment collaborator is mentioned less in the foreign declaration after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. Instead, the role of pro-European partner and advocate for a wider Europe get a bigger place in the foreign declarations. Since these roles aim towards EU's common security and foreign policy and the enlargement of the European Union (Aggestam, 2004:78), the conclusion can be drawn that Sweden has embraced the cooperation with the EU and therefore sees itself as a solidarity state towards the European Union.

Role theory has proven useful in explaining the limitations and conditions that apply to Sweden's positions and policies. This study has shown that role theory can contribute with answers to how it turns out Sweden has gone from neutrality to herring solidarity. While the study has resulted in the conclusion that the meaning of the foreign policy roles has changed and that this had significance concerning Sweden's foreign and security policy, however, the question remains as to what caused the role changes. The role-theoretical analysis could be supplemented with other explanatory models and thus achieve a comprehensive explanation. The fact that the analysis has resulted in this insight does not undermine the role-theoretical analysis. This insight seems reasonable since role theory is not regarded as a uniformly powerful theory but rather as a set of frameworks based on which states' positions and roles can be analysed (Aggestam, 2004:13).

Nevertheless, we believe that the benefit of a role-theoretic analysis remains when non-material explanations for states' positions and policies are added. As previously pointed out, however, role theory does not exclude other alternative explanatory models. The following words from the 2011 foreign declaration will conclude this study and symbolize the essence of Swedish foreign and security policy after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty:

Sweden will not react passively if a disaster or an attack would hit another member state of the European Union or another Nordic country. This also includes an expectation that these countries will act in the same way if Sweden is affected (Regeringen, 2011).

The excerpt shows the fundamental change in Swedish foreign and security policy that has taken place since the end of the Second World War. It also shows that Sweden no longer perceives itself as independent or neutral, but rather as a solidarity partner. This shows that Sweden's foreign and security policy has gone from neutrality to solidarity.

## 7.4 FUTURE RESEARCH

The emergence of Sweden's current security policy line based on cooperation and solidarity can, as previously stated, be explained on the basis of role theory with Sweden having moved from the role of independent and neutral to shaping its security policy based on the role of non-alignment collaborator. However, the signs of a change in the role of non-aligned collaborators that appear in 2010-2011 as the military non-alignment are no longer attributed to any great importance can be thought open to changes in Sweden's security policy line.

An interesting question for future studies would, therefore, be whether the role of non-alignment collaborator will develop after 2011 and whether the trend of reduced emphasis on military non-alignment in the foreign declaration will continue. One conceivable scenario is that Sweden concerning the EU as the Union's foreign and security policy cooperation deepens. If the role changes in that direction and Sweden no longer considers itself as a non-alignment state, it could open up for Sweden to enter into military alliances with other states in the future.

Furthermore, this area could be explored even more and include even more perspectives and material to create a broader study. We would, therefore, suggest that the historical arguments about a Swedish NATO membership could be included and compared with how Sweden reasoned about the EU's military capabilities this to demonstrate any possible changes. It would also be interesting to investigate how the European process develops and mainly how the impact of Europeanization can be measured. As our study strengthens the assumption that Sweden's foreign and security policy has been Europeanized in many ways, the result can be considered to be generalized to other member states in the EU. More specifically, in order to be able to determine simple mechanisms in detail, one possibility could be to compare the development of two different member states after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in future studies. A more in-depth case study of the case Sweden can also be made by comparing two different treaties, possibly by the Lisbon Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty. The final implications of foreign and security policy for the foreign policy decisions of the member states may determine the future. However, based on the current study, the role theoretical tools are considered to capture essential aspects of significant European influencing factors.

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