UK post-Brexit; The Service Economy Fallacy

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Abstract
In June 2016, UK chose to terminate the EU membership. The negotiation period for the exit (Brexit) has started at a time the UK economy has become increasingly dependent on the service sector as the main engine of job generation and a source of export demand. The purpose of this study is to give an overview of how Brexit possibly influences the service economy within the UK. The empiric data is collected from recent journal articles exposing issues regarding the service economy fallacies reasoned for regarding distribution of goods, user-financed services and tax-financed services. Findings revealed that a termination of the EU membership has led to market consternation and dramatic drop in the British Pound Sterling, which may affect the production costs, the wages, and the international trade that may lead to the fact that the competitiveness of the UK's service economy may be weaken. Besides, the sustainability of the pension system may be negatively affected due to the decreased immigration from other EU member states. Also, there is a need to reconstruction of the security and defence policies, which on the other hand may meet obstacles to remain the cost-efficiency.

Keywords: service economy fallacy, Brexit, UK

Introduction

On the 23rd of June 2016 UK voted, against the recommendations of leading economists and financial institutions, to leave the European Union (Pettifor, 2017; Morgan, 2017; Besch & Black, 2016). After that UK gave its notice regarding the termination of the EU membership a two-year period of negotiations for the terms of exit was initiated (Maican, 2016). Somai and Biedermann (2016) explains that it is this negotiation period that will determine the UK-EU relationship. Pettifor (2017, p. 127) means that *"the outcome threatens to undermine the pivotal role played by the City of London in 'globalization' and financialization the world economy"*. The EU today has been criticized as disunion since its members no longer share the same values regarding transnational government and policies (Steven, 2016). Powerful members persist in bending defiant members to their will, in addition to the tendency that participants hold opposed point of view towards agreement on various complications (Steven, 2016). Particularly, the issue that UK resents migrants from poorer countries in EU to work in UK eventually is the key driving force in the decision to leave EU (Lightfoot, 2016).

It has been vastly discussed and argued the outcome of such gigantic event on UK's economy (Brinded, 2016; Jackson, 2016; Noonan, 2016; Oxenford, 2016; Jongeneel et al., 2016; Whitman, 2016; Biscop, 2016; Hobolt, 2016; Armstrong & van de Ven, 2016). On the other hand, the UK economy has become increasingly dependent on the service sector as the main instrument of job generation and a derivation of export demand (Begg & Mushövel, 2016). According to the Office for National Statistics data, the proportion of services in total UK exports jumped from 28% to 41% with dramatic growth in crucial service activities, such as financial and business services. Several scholars have been criticized the dominance on the service sector which may lead to weakened competitiveness of the economy (Baumol, 1967; Gershuny, 1977; Griliches, 1992; Jansson, 2009; Søilen, 2012). There may be undoubtedly possibility that Brexit strikingly impacts on the UK's service economy. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to give an overview of how Brexit possibly influences the service economy within the UK. The study begins by developing a theoretical framework of the service economy fallacy that allows for a latter discussion of impact on Brexit. Extracted perspectives from different published papers, journals, and online newspapers are carefully analyzed and discussed. Finally, a conclusion of main contributions with implications for further research are carried out.

The Service Economy Fallacy

The service economy has relevance to the growing importance of the service sector in industrialized economies (Søilen, 2012). Previous scholars have discussed possible benefits of the service economy (Kendrick, 1985; Bailey & Gordon, 1988; Rowthorn & Ramaswamy, 1997; Wölfl, 2003). Services such as finance, wholesale trade, and retail trade, have been applying new information and communication technology and are corresponding to manufacturing industries regarding productivity (Bailey & Gordon, 1988). The potential in the service sector is greater by the expanse of efficiency distinctive between manufacturing and service industries (Rowthorn & Ramaswamy, 1997).

Despite such optimistic claims, there has been much criticism opposed to the argument that production can be replaced by service (Baumol, 1967; Gershuny, 1977; Griliches, 1992; Jansson, 2009; Søilen, 2012). An increase in the proportion of the service sector suggests that productivity change in an economy is progressively limited to that of the service sector (Baumol, 1967; Gershuny, 1977). Consequently, the shift to services causes negative effect on the total productivity or economic growth (Baumol, 1967). Søilen (2012) explains the fallacy of the service economy as an immoderate reliance on a post-industrial solution for economic growth, particularly production is substituted by service. This switch has led to weakened competitiveness of the economy, especially in Western countries (Søilen, 2012). Jansson (2009) affirms that raising supremacy of the service sector is a misconception and it is a largely statistical illusion from the unconventional interpretation of the service sector in the national accounts.

The service economy can be divided into three main areas: *distribution of goods*, *user-financed consumer services*, and *tax-financed consumer services* (Jansson, 2009). The fundamental production factors in all industries, according to Jansson (2009), are labour, capital, and land that provide services. In terms of distribution of goods, it is an essential connection between production and consumption of material products. The products complete their final form and customer contact is a main aspect of the work. Griliches (1992) stresses the importance of manufacturing industries which generate an increase in labour productivity. Søilen (2012) further argues that export of products results in the achievement in national wealth. Søilen (2012) points out benefits of the combination between production and exports lead to extraordinary productivity and are adopted by countries such as Germany, Sweden, and China. Regarding user-financed services, Søilen (2012) criticizes the financial industry improve itself by giving loans and making debt financing which makes individuals and organizations entangled and gradually leads to economic bubble. Besides, when it comes to tax-financed services, Jansson (2009) and Gershuny (1977) express their concern about dormant health care, education and total employment. If the quality of these services cannot be maintained, the welfare states will be facing numerous difficulties (Gershuny, 1977; Jansson, 2012).

To sum up, Søilen (2012) synthesizes nine reasons that primary emphasis on the service sector does not lead to a long-term advantage of the economy, which can be described, as follows:

1. A strong focus on services distracts from production and causes obstacles for production firms to compete in their home market, which leads them to reallocate;
2. Services often associate with products. Good service providers are also often production providers. If production is remoted, there is a risk that services will vanish;
3. Services are easier to copy while products are normally hard to copy;
4. There is a trend in developed countries to move production to developing/less developed countries. This is a misconception when production requires more knowledge to stay updated;
5. There has been a conception that it is easier and quicker to make money on services while honest work is time-consuming and hard to learn;
6. The service economy has validated the formation of a vast financial industry built on debt. This makes the economy less competitive;
7. The service economy is used as a reason for sustainable development. This is contradicted to the fact that sustainable development must be supported by new and more advanced products;
8. It is normally believed that services are more advanced and cause less pollution than production, the idea of factory workers turn out to be educated workers become the symbol of the advancement of the society;
9. The emphasis on services rather than production replaces concerns from long term to short term.

Methodology

This study is addressing the research purpose in line with a *qualitative method*. The *content analysis* is conducted with a theoretical framework and *secondary data* as a foundation. The theoretical review regarding the concept of 'service economy' and its fallacies is based on journal articles as well as relevant literature. The purpose of this study is investigated through a *deductive approach*; the empiric data is collected from recent journal articles exposing issues described in the theoretical framework.



Fig. 1: *An explanatory model of the research Design*

The authors have used two major databases while conducting the study; *Web of Science* and *Scopus*. Several search- and keywords were combined to collect relevant data (table 1).

Database	Search words (result)	Keyword 1 (result)	Keyword 2 (result)	Keyword 3 (result)	Keyword 4 (result)	Keyword 5 (result)
Web of Science	Brexit (375)	Pension (2)	Defence (7)	Security (18)	Agriculture (3)	Trade (21)
Scopus	Brexit (567)	Pension (3)	Defence (20)	Security (18)	Agriculture (9)	Trade (89)
Web of Science	Service Economy (17,024)	UK (489)	UK & Banks (31)	Fallacy (11)	Misconception (10)	---
Web of Science	User financed services (774)	UK (18)	Banks (46)	---	---	---
Web of Science	Tax financed services (658)	UK (16)	---	---	---	---
Web of Science	Bremain (4)	---	---	---	---	---

Table 1: *An overview of data search results*

Distribution of Goods

About 70% of UK's import originate from EU member states (Jongeneel et al., 2016). The termination of the EU membership means that UK may no longer be able to take advantage of the many WTO- and free trade agreements within EU. However, Jongeneel (2016) explains that it is still possible to be a part of the EU WTO including trades agreements with the third-party countries. The terms will be determined during the two-year negotiation process following Brexit.

UK's agriculture consists of 60-65% export to other EU member states (Jongeneel et al., 2016). The national agriculture is decreasing (Grant, 2016). In 2010 only 14% of the farmers were under 45 years and 33 % was over 65 years already (Jongeneel et al., 2016). Grant (2016) explains that agriculture is already a challenging business sector to operate in and Brexit may contribute to further issues. UK government does not have any national continuity plans. Currently, the agriculture is depending on grants operated by the EU. Brexit may lead to that UK would have to restructure the internal financing as the national agriculture would not be able to take advantage of these grants (Grant, 2016). Jongeneel et al. (2016) explain that there are three different scenarios when it comes to UK-EU trade; *UK-EU FTA, Default WTO* and *UK Trade Liberalisation*. With agriculture as an example, an *UK-EU FTA* agreement would mean that UK would have to pay Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQ) on goods that are categorised as "sensitive", i.e. sheep and lamb meat. The *default WTO* scenario would mean for the UK that they would be charged full TRQ on all trades. The third scenario, exemplified on agriculture, by Jongeneel et al. (2016), the *UK Trade Liberation*, is similar to the *default WTO* scenario. The major different is that UK would decrease their tariffs with 50% to all third parties, including EU member states. The *UK-EU FTA* and the *Default WTO* scenarios would both conclude in an increase in UK domestic producer prices (Jongeneel et al., 2016). However, Jongeneel et al. (2016) explain that the *UK Trade Liberation* may result in a decreased price on imported products (Fig. 2). This would especially affect the agriculture as the import protection rates are high within this product category. Although, if the prices are reduced this will also affect the income (Fig. 4).



Fig. 2: *The percentage price change for selected crops and animal products* (Jongeneel et al., 2016, p. 29).



Fig. 3: *The percentage changes in production for selected crops and animal products* (Jongeneel et al., 2016, p. 30).



Fig. 4: *Income effects per farm type, per scenario, compared to the 2012/2013 average income* (Jongeneel et al., 2016, p. 30).

User-financed Services

The UK user-financial sector is the second largest financial sector in the world, making it a crucial element of the British economy as well as the global financial system (Oxenford, 2016). Half of the world's financial organizations have based their European headquarters in London, and more than 1 million people work in the financial sector in the UK (EGOV, 2016).

According to the Office for National Statistics, UK's financial sector exported £20.2 billion of its services to the EU in 2014, roughly 41% of the UK's financial services export total of £20.2 billion. Besides, the EU is the largest trading partner for banks based in the UK (Lightfoot, 2016), which means that UK's financial sector is heavily interconnected within the EU. The Brexit vote has generated uncertainty and jeopardized UK growth prospects, with especially uncertainty for London, the EU's largest financial centre (Jackson, 2016). IMF (2016) have warned that the balance of risk for the UK economy is negative and will have lasting effects.



Fig. 5: *The Royal Bank of Scotland Share Price* (The Telegraph, 2017)

It is reported that UK international banks and non-UK banks would be most directly influenced by Brexit (Oxenford, 2016). The Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) seemed to suffer the most from this gigantic event (Fig. 5) (Brinded, 2016), and is still nursing a 34% loss since the result was announced (Cunningham, 2016). It is reported that RBS lost £6.5 billion from conduct, litigation, and restructuring costs (Brinded, 2016). UK membership of the EU gives free access to the marketing of all 28 member states. Normally, the predominance of non-UK banks' assets, denoting more than £1 trillion, are European Economic Area (EEA) based; i.e. EEA banks can control in a unified manner across borders within the EEA. Brexit would terminate this 'passport' advantage, making the UK operations of EEA banks and European operations of UK banks essentially more difficult to manage (Oxenford, 2016). To preserve access to clients, several financial organizations claim that Brexit would likely to lead them to reallocate from the UK to subsidiaries in the EU (IMF, 2016; Wohl, 2016). Particularly, HSBC stated that it may move approximately 1,000 trading jobs to Paris, JPMorgan said that it may move around 4,000 jobs out of London, and Morgan Stanley claimed that it may move 1,000 jobs out of UK (Wohl, 2016). Additionally, after the Brexit vote, JPMorgan estimated average 13% earnings per share cuts in both 2017 and 2018 for UK and non-UK banks, which may lead to lower loan growth and increase in bad debt provisions as the economy slows, and higher loan losses (Noonan, 2016). Shiereck et. al. (2016) further illustrate evidence that non-UK banks experienced drops in their stock prices following Brexit.

The dramatic fall in British Pound Sterling has led to the fact that non-UK banks will get exceedingly less profit (Oxenford, 2016). After Britain voted to leave the EU, the British Pound fell to £1.315 on Monday June 27th 2016 (Fig. 5), the lowest level since 1985 (Foster & Batchelor, 2016). A report conducted by Noonan (2016) on the Financial Times illustrates that Santander's first-quarter earnings were showing the impact of Brexit, particularly, there was

5% drop in group-wide earnings but they were up 8% when the decrease in the Brazilian real and the British Pound were stripped out. Since then the British Pound has dropped further against the Euro and the US dollar. The uncertainty around gigantic economic and politic event like Brexit led to market consternation and an extreme downward of the British Pound (Foster & Batchelor, 2016).



Fig. 6: *Pound against the Euro* (European Central Bank, 2017).

Other sectors such as insurance and funds would lose admission to the single market, making UK financial industry less competitive in the long term (Oxenford, 2016). Oxenford (2016) further concerns that many of London's functions are likely to be transferred to other financial centres in Europe while global activities will be reallocated to New York.

Tax-Financed Services

Several scholars explain that one main reason to the outcome of the Brexit-voting is the anti-immigration trends within the British society (Hobolt, 2016; Armstrong & van de Ven, 2016). Armstrong and van de Ven (2016) discuss that a decrease of immigration in the UK, would affect the sustainability of the pension system negatively. In a study by Razin and Sadka (1999) the immigration is demonstrated to be dynamic to the pay-as-you-go pension. Armstrong and van de Ven (2016) explain that the population age is raising. They discuss further that the foreign workforce may be able to contribute to diminish the gap in the pension resources. Dustmann and Frattini (2014) mean that it is mostly the immigrants within the EEA that are contributing to the positive effect on the pension system in the UK. Wadsworth et al. (2016) agree with the statement of Dustmann and Frattini (2014) and adds that the EEA-immigrants in the UK is usually of a younger age, higher educated and are less likely to take advantages of public benefits than UK-citizens. This implies that they do not collect as much welfare as they pay in taxes.

A simulation of net immigration by Armstrong and van de Ven (2016) proposes that most people tend to immigrate to UK in the age of 18-24 and in total it is more EU members that non-EU immigrants. Frattini (2014) mentions that the prediction is that the EEA-immigrants may be the most decreasing group of immigrants in terms of the new regulations that comes with Brexit.



Fig. 7: *Simulation scenario net migration from 2020 to 2021* (Armstrong & van de Ven, 2016).

Besides the issue regarding decreased immigration, security and defence has been a hot topic to discuss regarding Brexit. Though, Whitman (2016) mentions that there are no suggestions for models regarding how country security will be constructed when the termination of the EU membership is final. Whitman (2016) explains that UK use to be the most active party in security questions within the EU parliament, however over the past decades UK have taken a step back and seem to want to go in a different direction than the leading countries regarding security issues. Whitman (2016) and Biscop (2016) agree that by terminating the EU membership UK should become more involved within security issues as it mostly was handled by a council within EU before. Uttley and Wilkinson (2016) cite the Daily Telegraph where the former chief of armed services says that *"Europe faces a series of 'grave security challenges' and that the UK is in a 'stronger' position to deal with them from inside"*. It is however important to point out that even though UK leave EU, it does not mean that UK will leave the CSDP. If UK chose to be a part of the CSDP they would still be able to be a part of missions and would still provide battlegroups (Whitman, 2016; Biscop, 2016).

Biscop (2016, p. 431) argues that without the cooperation between the member states of EU the defence efforts are not cost-effective; *"fragmentation and duplication, defence expenditure—even as in some countries it is rising—does not yield enough employable capability"*. Uttley and Wilkinson (2016) explain that the discussion pro-Bremain, to continue the EU membership, argues on the other hand that UK would be able to save a lot of money by implementing a national security policy instead of partaking in the EU policy. However, Uttley and Wilkinson (2016) argue that the current arrangements within EU policy only provides UK with a domestic turnover of 30 billion pounds per annum. They argue further that this amount concludes the security export as well as employs 215,000 highly skilled personnel and support 150,000 jobs.

Discussion

Distribution of Goods

Søilen (2012) argues that export of products results in the achievement in national wealth. Several scholars argue that the export/import agreements may change as UK terminated the EU membership (Jongeneel et al., 2016; Lightfoot, 2016; Whitman, 2016; Biscop, 2016). The negotiation process has started and UK is working to create regulations and policies that has previously been regulated by EU. Jongeneel et al. (2016) explain the urgent issues that UK may face regarding trading fees as 70% of their import is from EU member states. Also, a large sum of export goes under the free trade agreements within EU. An example is raised in this study regarding the effect that Brexit will have when it comes to agriculture and its distribution. 60-65% of UK's agriculture is exported to other EU member states.

According to Søilen (2012), many manufacturing countries tend to move to other locations as the production prices are raised. There may however be other issues that will decrease the local production within the agriculture industry. Firstly, UK farmers receive a lot of grants from EU. As these may decrease, depending on the new UK policies, the production costs may increase. Secondly, Jongeneel et al. (2016) explain that the average age of farmers in the UK is very high; In 2010 only 14% of the farmers were under 45 years and 33% was over 65 years. This may mean that the number of farmers will decrease drastically in the upcoming decades. However, it doesn't mean that the production should decrease. It may be that the production just become more concentrated. If the agriculture would decrease in line with the number of farmers, UK may have to import more agricultural products. This can have several outcomes, but if UK were to be excluded from EEA this may conclude in raised consumer end prices.

If the agriculture were to decrease by to much this would affect other service providers. Søilen (2012) explain that services often associate with products. If production is remoted, there is a risk that services will vanish. If the agriculture decrease this could increase the competition among all between traders as well as the production intermediators. This could also increase prices.

As the agriculture is decreasing, according to Jongeneel et al. (2016), and the UK-EU trade negotiations may conclude in TRQ on all trades the consumer prices may increase. Also, it is possible to see a decrease in the value of the British Pound since Brexit. This means that the manufacturers who need to import components need to pay more, which may increase the customer prices even more. The raised prices will unfortunately not be synchronised with the wages of the population. If this scenario occurs, it may conclude in inflation.

User-financed Services

Leaving the EU is likely to increase trade restrictiveness in services. It can be argued that Brexit would weaken the UK's position in Europe since regulatory agreement would need to be sustained. EU is the largest trading partner for banks based in the UK (Lightfoot, 2016). UK-based banks may be faced with the problem of relocation parts of their headquarters to remain access to EU markets (IMF, 2016; Oxenford, 2016; Wohl, 2016). Several international banks such as HSBC, JPMorgan, and Morgan Stanley have claimed their estimation to shift jobs to outside UK, especially to other financial centres in Europe (Wohl, 2016). Such movement may increase extremely high costs to firms at a circumstance when cost savings are vitally important to stay competitive. Other sectors such as insurance and funds would lose admission to the single market, making UK financial industry less competitive in the long term (Oxenford, 2016). Reflected on Søilen (2012)'s argument, this may also damage the competitive advantages of the UK economy.

It is reported that more than 1 million people work in the financial sector in the UK (EGOV, 2016). The Brexit vote has undoubtedly caused uncertainty and threatened UK growth prospects, with especially uncertainty for London, the EU's largest financial centre. One impact that may be immediately felt could be a decrease in EU high-skilled labour that currently works in UK Financial Services. A requirement for visas and work permits which are time-consuming and numerously document-required may generate a barrier that could damage the UK's thriving service sector and put thousands to hundred thousands of jobs at risk.

Brexit has led to market shock and a dramatic fall of the British Pound (Foster & Batchelor, 2016). This may result in inflation and the value of the British Pound slumps. High inflation rates can be regarded as harmful to an overall economy. The marginal effect of inflation on banking lending activity and stock market progress shrinks quickly. High inflation can give rise to employees to demand rapid wage increases, combined with the circumstance that employment is at risk due to terminated 'passport' rights, may lead to marketing inefficiency and less competitiveness. Furthermore, consistent with Søilen (2012)'s claim about strong emphasis on service sector, uncertainties of such economic and political event like Brexit may cause uncertainty about the future purchasing power of money that may discourage investment and savings.

Tax-Financed Services

Jansson (2009) and Gershuny (1977) express concern that these services may not be able to keep the same standard after Brexit. As mentioned before, the negotiations regarding UK-EU corporations are ongoing until two years after the Brexit vote. Therefore, there has not been any changes yet that have influenced the tax-financed services as they are dependent of the outcome of the negotiations. However, this study has investigated possible issues that may occur.

Several scholars explain that one reason to the outcome of the Brexit-voting is the anti-immigration trends within the British society (Hobolt, 2016; Armstrong & van de Ven, 2016). It may be possible to say that the restrictions regarding immigration can come to be of a stricter nature. This may become an issue when it comes to the structure of the pay-as-you-go pension system. If the UK-EU negotiations result in that UK will not be a part of the EEA, the decrease in young professionals will decrease drastically at the same time as the population age is increasing. This means that more people will receive pension whilst there will be less people who contribute to the pay-as-you-go system. This may conclude in a need for reconstruction of the UK pension system.

Another issue that has been discussed by several scholars regarding the Brexit is the effects this may have on UK's national security and defence. Many restrictions and policies regarding the defence. Whitman (2016) mean that UK haven't been as engaged in the security and defence questions within EU lately as they use to be. The termination of the EU membership may conclude in stricter border controls as EU member state citizens may not be allowed to travel to UK in the same way as before. Another issue raised is the cost efficiency of having a national security and defence (Biscop, 2016). Today the security and defence structure provide many jobs for UK citizens. Some authors argue that there may be a decrease in this sector. However, there is no clear evidence and the UK government have not mention any plans regarding the restructure, is depends on the UK-EU negotiations.

Conclusion

When UK voted, on the 23rd of June 2016, to leave EU a two-year UK-EU negotiation process was initiated. This study has investigated several possible service economy fallacies Brexit may result in regarding distribution of goods, user-financed services and tax-financed services.

70% of the UK import is from the EU member states. Brexit may conclude in TRQ on all imports, which would raise production-, service- and end customer prices. Also, a great amount of the UK export is with EU member states. A termination of the EU membership may mean that there will be no more EU grants for UK, this may also affect the production costs. As the prices for end customers continue to raise the British Pound becomes weaker, this may result in inflation as the wages will not be synchronised with the increased living expenses. One sector that may be affected by this is the agriculture as their production consist of 60-65% export to EU member states as well as they are dependent on the EU grants.

The UK user-financial sector is a crucial component of the British economy as well as the global financial system. Brexit has generated predicted obstacles for financial firms to face regarding relocation, employment, investment, savings, et cetera, which may damage dramatically to competitiveness of the UK's service economy. Brexit has led to market consternation and dramatic drop in the British Pound Sterling, which may affect deeply and vastly to different parts of the user-financed service sector. Admission to the single market may be challenged, making UK financial industry less competitive in the long term. It can be implied that further strengthen analysis and data on interconnectedness and related risk should be prioritized. Further efforts are needed to consummate the refine scheme in this sector and ensure the resolvability of financial firms.

One central discussion of the Brexit-Bremain voting was the question of immigration. This may mean that the immigration policies will come to change as UK leave EU. The immigration may have several effects on the service economy. As the immigration from other EU member states decrease the sustainability of the pay-as-you-go pension system may be tested. This because the immigrants are making a great contribution to this system. Also, the population age is increasing and the number of pensioners will become more significant. This would result in more pensioners and less money would be paid into the pension system. Also, the security and defence policies will need reconstruction as UK terminate the EU membership. This restriction in the defence and security may have difficulty to remain the cost-efficiency.

An interesting factor that is worth mentioning is as well that the citizens of Scotland voted for Bremain. When the voting took place regarding the Scottish independence a few years back the it was an even vote with a small margin more for “remain within UK”. It may be possible that Brexit will lead the way to a new Scottish voting for independency. It would be interesting to make a deeper study regarding why Scottish citizens wanted to remain within EU and try. The authors believe that this would be of great importance for the future of the UK. This statement is based on the already existing segregation between the Scottish population and the rest of the UK, the authors mean that this type of issue may accelerate an already existing divided nation to separate further.

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